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EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, ETHICS, AND THE 
ROAD TO THE DISBARMENT OF MIKE NIFONG: THE 
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF FULL OPEN-FILE 
DISCOVERY 
 
Robert P. Mosteller* 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What has come to be known as the Duke Lacrosse case began in the 
spring of 2006 with allegations of a racially motivated gang rape. It ended a 
little more than a year later with the exoneration of three players, who had 
been indicted, and the disbarment and resignation of Durham County Dis- 
trict Attorney Michael Nifong, who had pressed the baseless case forward 
with reckless abandon. In this Article, I examine the disciplinary charges 
brought by the North Carolina State Bar against Nifong for failure to dis- 
close potentially exculpatory evidence, two other disciplinary actions that 
preceded Nifong’s case, and the discovery reforms that stand at the heart of 
the effort to do justice in the associated criminal prosecutions. 
The State Bar’s ethics case against Nifong is unusual in many ways, 
including the filing of disciplinary charges against a prosecutor before the 
criminal trial commenced, the clarity of the violations, and the violation of 
both the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose potentially exculpatory DNA 
evidence and to refrain from improper pretrial publicity. As global as Ni- 
fong’s ethics violations were, the case illustrates the importance of specific 
duties rather than broad precepts for the imposition of professional disci- 
pline. 
Rather than focusing initially or exclusively on the national spectacle 
that became the disbarment of Michael Nifong, I examine a series of three 
disciplinary cases brought by the North Carolina State Bar from 2004 to 
2007 against prosecutors and begin with two cases and earlier associated 
reforms that I believe helped pave the way to Nifong’s disbarment. The first 
case involved Special Prosecutors David Hoke and Debra C. Graves of the 
North Carolina Attorney General’s Office, who were reprimanded in the 
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Powell, Rich Rosen, Mike Tigar, and Fred Zacharias for their comments on an earlier draft of this arti- 
cle, Gretchen Engel, Allison Rice, and John Rubin for their advice, and Allison Hester-Haddad for her 
help as research assistant. 
 258 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 15:2 
 
fall of 20041 for withholding exculpatory information in the 1998 murder 
trial of James Alan Gell, in which he was convicted and sentenced to death. 
The second involved District Attorney Kenneth Honeycutt and Assistant 
District Attorney Scott Brewer, who were charged with withholding excul- 
patory evidence in the 1995 murder trial of Jonathan Gregory Hoffman, 
who was similarly convicted and sentenced to death. The disciplinary 
charges against Honeycutt and Brewer were dismissed on technical grounds 
in the spring of 2006 at the outset of the disciplinary hearing proceedings.2 I 
then examine the disciplinary proceeding against District Attorney Michael 
Nifong for improper pretrial publicity and withholding potentially exculpa- 
tory DNA evidence in the Duke Lacrosse case, which resulted in his dis- 
barment in June 2007.3 
The Duke Lacrosse case, which Nifong prosecuted, is widely seen as a 
fiasco,4 with extremely serious ethics violations that had numerous harmful 
consequences, among which were the effect of the charges on the lives of 
the three Duke Lacrosse players and their families.5 Remarkably, the Gell 
and Hoffman cases, although far less well known, are at least its rivals if 
not worse. Indeed, with regard to the consequences of the prosecutors’ ac- 
tions to the men charged, they far exceed those in the Duke Lacrosse case. 
These two prosecutions resulted in the convictions of two men for capital 
 
1 The order of discipline was announced, as is typical, at the end of the proceedings, which were 
conducted on September 23 and 24, 2004. Order of Discipline, N.C. State Bar v. Hoke, No. 04 DHC 15 
(Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar Dec. 2, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Hoke & Graves Disciplinary Order]. The written order setting out the Disciplinary Hearing Committee’s 
reasoning and the formal written reprimand were filed on December 2, 2004. Reprimand, Hoke, No. 04 
DHC 15 (on file with author) [Hereinafter Hoke & Graves Reprimand]. 
2 Proceedings were held on January 5 and 20, 2006, and the written order was entered on April 4, 
2006. Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss, N.C. State Bar v. Brewer, No. 05 
DHC 37 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar Apr. 4, 2006) (on file with author) [here- 
inafter Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Dismissal Order]. 
3 Proceedings were held from June 12 through June 16, 2007, and the written order was entered 
on July 10, 2007. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline at 1, 24, N.C. State Bar 
v. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 10, 2007) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Nifong Bar Order]. An amended order was filed on July 24, 2007. Amended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Discipline at 24, N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, No. 06 
DHC 35 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar July 24, 2007) (on file with author) [here- 
inafter Amended Nifong Bar Order]. 
4 Excerpt Transcript, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order of Discipline at 16, 29 
(June 16, 2007), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinafter Excerpt Transcript Findings 
of Fact] (showing that Disciplinary Hearing Committee Chairman F. Lane Williamson twice used the 
term “fiasco” to describe Nifong’s handling of the case). 
5 See, e.g., David Evans Sr. State Bar Testimony (WRAL television broadcast June 16, 2007), 
available at http://www.wral.com/news/local/video/1507000/ (father of accused player Dave Evans); 
Mary Ellen Finnerty State Bar Testimony (WRAL television broadcast June 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.wral.com/news/local/video/1507031/ (mother of accused player Collin Finnerty); Reade 
Seligmann Full Testimony (WRAL television broadcast June 15, 2007), available at http://www.wral. 
com/news/local/video/1503575/. 
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murder and years of imprisonment, much of it on North Carolina’s death 
row. Moreover, clearly in Gell, and arguably in Hoffman, the sweep of the 
exculpatory information withheld was also greater, although in neither of 
those cases were the prosecutors found to have knowingly withheld the 
evidence.6 
These cases, including Nifong’s disbarment, demonstrate the difficul- 
ties inherent in professional discipline of prosecutors, even in clear cases of 
ethical misconduct. The ethical duty to “do justice” is hardly a real source 
of discipline for two reasons. First, it applies to difficult to judge determina- 
tions—the fundamentally discretionary decisions of whether to charge and 
prosecute and other broad judgments about how to conduct the prosecution. 
Second, proving the requisite knowledge or intent by the prosecutor is in- 
herently difficult both practically and theoretically. Even as to the some- 
what more concrete duty to disclose exculpatory information, many  of 
those same difficulties of characterization, knowledge, and intent make 
professional discipline problematic. These cases in general, and the success 
in the Nifong case in particular, show the importance of concrete standards 
of conduct, such as an obligation of full disclosure, which apply to the 
mundane details of the investigation as well as the exculpatory. Such re- 
quirements have the definite advantage that they can be enforced in the first 
instance without relying on a prosecutor to recognize, or a trial court to 
find, the exculpatory potential in material in the investigative file. 
While many observers believed that the rigor of the disciplinary pro- 
ceedings in Nifong’s case was at least in part influenced by the limited pun- 
ishment imposed against Hoke and Graves and the total failure to discipline 
Honeycutt and Brewer,7 those cases at most established an atmosphere con- 
ducive to Bar action. Far more important was a revision of discovery rules 
occasioned by the first of those cases, the Gell prosecution, which led to the 
exoneration of the charged players and the discipline of Nifong by opening 
 
6 In his explanation of the discipline imposed on Nifong, Disciplinary Hearing Committee 
Chairman F. Lane Williamson addressed both of these cases, noting that while the potential impact was 
greater, the lack of allegation and proof of intentional wrongdoing in one case and a procedural Bar in 
the other meant very different outcomes from the Bar’s disciplinary process. Excerpt Transcript Find- 
ings of Fact, supra note 4, at 24-26. 
7 Letter from Michael B. Nifong, Durham County Dist. Attorney, to Katherine E. Jean, Counsel, 
N.C. State Bar, 7 (Dec. 28, 2006), Exhibit 233, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinafter 
First Nifong Response to Jean] (responding to Bar’s Letter of Notice and Substance of Grievance and 
stating that “[f]or some time now, the ‘word on the street’ in prosecutorial circles has been that the 
North Carolina State Bar, stung by the criticism resulting from past decisions involving former prosecu- 
tors with names like Hoke and Graves and Honeycutt and Brewer, is looking for a prosecutor of which 
to make an example”); Anne Blythe & Joseph Neff, Nifong, Bar Will Both Be Judged: Recent Lapses 
Put Regulators on Spot, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 10, 2007, at A1 (making reference to 
the “tepid prosecution” of the prosecutors in the Gell case and the dismissal on technical grounds in the 
Hoffman case and arguing that those cases put pressure on the Bar to “get it right” when disciplining 
Nifong). 
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the prosecutor’s files. Gell’s new trial8 and exoneration was itself the con- 
sequence of enactment of an earlier, more limited open-file discovery stat- 
ute for post-conviction review in capital cases. Such discovery rules are not 
at all couched in ethical precepts. Indeed, they are roughly the opposite in 
that they do not rely on the ethical judgment of a prosecutor involved in a 
fiercely competitive adversary trial process to determine what is exculpa- 
tory. Instead, they impose a blanket rule of general disclosure. 
The three cases discussed in this Article reflect North Carolina’s ex- 
perience with a dramatic change in criminal discovery. In two steps, the 
state moved from a highly traditional, restrictive discovery procedure that 
guaranteed only minimal disclosure to the defense of the prosecution’s evi- 
dence to a statute that entitles the defense to relatively full access to both 
prosecution and law enforcement files. 
In Part I, I discuss the disciplinary action that arose from the prosecu- 
tion of Alan Gell in 2002 for capital murder. I first describe how an open- 
file discovery law applicable to post-conviction proceedings in death pen- 
alty cases contributed to the discovery of the critical exculpatory evidence 
that led both to reversal of Gell’s conviction and to disciplinary action 
against Hoke and Graves, who prosecuted him. Gell’s acquittal in a retrial 
where the exculpatory evidence was presented produced, in turn, the pas- 
sage of a similar full open-file discovery law broadly applicable in the trial 
of all felony cases.9 The disciplinary proceedings led to an order of repri- 
mand against these two prosecutors, and the outrage that followed what was 
seen as lenient treatment led to disciplinary rule reform as well. 
In Part II, I describe the exculpatory evidence found during post- 
conviction proceedings related to the 1996 trial of Jonathan Gregory Hoff- 
man for capital murder and the ethics proceedings against the attorneys who 
secured that conviction. The charges were dismissed for technical reasons 
for failure to file charges within the “statute of limitations.” These proceed- 
 
 
8 The granting of a new trial for Hoffman, which ultimately resulted in dismissal of charges, was 
also in part the consequence of evidence found as a result of this new law as well. See Affidavit of 
Robert H. Hale, Jr. Regarding Sealed File of Porter Materials at 1-3, Exhibit 4.11, Third Amendment to 
Defendant’s Motion for Appropriate Relief, State v. Hoffman, No. 95 CRS 15695 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 
30, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Exhibits to Third Amended Hoffman MAR] (describing 
comparison of the prosecution’s files with sealed material presented to Judge William H. Helms, which 
revealed that prosecutors withheld notes from several meetings with a government witness who was 
offered various inducements in exchange for testimony). Although the prosecutor did not concede 
innocence, as Hoffman’s defense claims, he dismissed charges against Hoffman in December 2007 
because he concluded he had insufficient evidence to continue the prosecution. See Emily C. 
Achenbaum, A Murder Case Dissolves, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 12, 2007, at A1 
(explaining that the star witness against Hoffman, Johnell Porter, had told a newspaper reporter that he 
made up his testimony and a second witness had died). 
9 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-901 (2006) (making the discovery statutes applicable to cases 
within the original jurisdiction of the superior court, which excludes most misdemeanors). 
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ings have no direct link to the discipline against Nifong, but they show 
other impediments to successful professional discipline against prosecutors. 
The Gell and Hoffman prosecutions also are part of a larger, troubling 
critique of the constitutional doctrine that requires the prosecution to pro- 
vide exculpatory evidence to the defense, known generally as the Brady 
doctrine.10 The doctrine does not work very well as a disclosure device. 
Beginning in 1998, including Gell and Hoffman, ten death penalty cases in 
North Carolina have been reversed after trial because of prosecution fail- 
ures to provide Brady information. All involved cases were tried before the 
first open-file law went into effect, and all were reversed after the files of 
the prosecution and law enforcement were opened.11 
 
10 The doctrine takes its name from Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963), where the United 
States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to provide exculpatory 
evidence to the defense. 
11 State v. Canady, 559 S.E.2d 762, 767 (N.C. 2002) (ordering new trial because the State failed to 
disclose the name of the confidential informant who implicated persons other than client in the mur- 
ders); State v. Chapman, Nos. 92-CRS 18186, 93 CRS 11980, slip op. at 184-85 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 
6, 2007) (on file with author) (vacating murder convictions resulting in death penalty case based, inter 
alia, on violations of Brady and Napue v Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959)); State v. Walker, Nos. 92 CRS 
20762, 70920, slip op. at 39-42 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 15, 2006) (on file with author) (reversing convic- 
tion and vacating death sentence for violations of Brady and Napue); State v. Pinch, Nos. 80 CRS 
16429-30, slip op. at 53-62 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 2005) (on file with author) (reversing convictions 
and vacating death sentences for violation of Brady and other errors); State v. Hamilton, No. 95 CRS 
1670, slip op. at 14-16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2003) (on file with author) (ordering new trial because 
the State failed to disclose evidence that sole witness against client testified in hopes of a deal from the 
prosecution); State v. Bishop, Nos. 93 CRS 20410-23, slip op. at 19 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000) (on 
file with author) (ordering new trial for due process violation where the State failed to disclose evidence 
that placed client elsewhere at the time of the crime and contradicted key informant’s testimony); State 
v. Munsey, No. 93 CRS 4078, slip op. at 23-25 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 14, 1999) (on file with author) 
(ordering new trial for due process violation where the State failed to disclose evidence that key witness 
against client had fabricated his story); State v. Womble, Nos. 93 CRS 1992-93, slip op. at 1 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. July 22, 1998) (on file with author) (ordering new trial for due process violation where the 
State failed to disclose evidence concerning victim’s time of death inconsistent with evidence presented 
at trial). See also Joseph Neff & Andrea Weigl, Withheld Evidence Leads to New Trials, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 1, 2005, at A18 (discussing briefly reversals in the Bishop, Canady, 
Hamilton, Munsey, Bishop, and Womble cases). Although a few of these cases come from the same 
judicial district (for example, the Hoffman case is from Union County and the Hamilton case is from 
Richmond County) and thus involved the same prosecutors, they generally are spread across the state 
and involve different prosecutors. 
Not all of these reversals were produced by the new discovery law applicable to death penalty 
cases. See, e.g., Canady, 559 S.E.2d at 767 (reversing case on direct appeal due to the State’s failure to 
disclose potentially exculpatory evidence). Moreover, relief was occasionally reversed on Brady 
grounds before the new law. See, e.g., McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945, 950 (4th Cir. 1988) (ordering 
new trial for black defendant because State failed to disclose evidence that eyewitness initially told law 
enforcement authorities that the perpetrator was white); State v. Oliver, No. 78 CRS 25575, slip op. at 
56 (N.C. Super Ct. Jan. 25, 1994) (on file with author) (ordering new sentencing hearing because the 
State failed to disclose impeaching evidence regarding the key eyewitness’ identification of the defen- 
dant as gunman). I am keenly aware that Brady had utility before the new law because I represented 
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In Part III, I describe the most important events in the Duke Lacrosse 
case that led to ethics charges against Nifong and his ultimate disbarment. 
Although almost completely separate from his failure to provide exculpa- 
tory DNA evidence, Nifong was also charged with improper pretrial public- 
ity. The North Carolina State Bar’s decision to file disciplinary charges 
based on that conduct before the trial in the rape prosecution commenced 
played a critical role in altering the path of the case. However, in this part, I 
concentrate on the painstaking steps that the defense took to have the data 
behind those conclusions disclosed and the role of disclosure statutes in 
their success. 
In Part IV, I argue that the message of these cases is the paramount 
importance of a broad and sure disclosure requirement in criminal cases 
that, in the first instance, helps prevent failures of ethical standards from 
ever occurring because little opportunity is allowed for misjudging what is 
potentially exculpatory evidence. Where an initial failure occurs, such pro- 
visions also assist the court and opposing counsel in learning of the failure 
at a relatively early stage in the proceeding. The competitive process of the 
adversary criminal trial presents inherent challenges to the critical but 
vague duty “to do justice.” More concrete, specific, and mundane rules of 
discovery are the best alternative. As is obvious, full discovery of all evi- 
dence in the files of the prosecutor and investigative agencies also discloses 
exculpatory evidence as required by the Constitution and completely satis- 
fies the related ethical command. 
 
I. DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST SPECIAL PROSECUTORS DAVID HOKE 
AND DEBRA C. GRAVES ARISING FROM THE CAPITAL PROSECUTION 
OF ALAN GELL 
 
A. An Open-File Discovery Statute for Post-Conviction Litigation in 
Death Penalty Cases that Begins the Process 
 
The path that ultimately led to disciplinary action against Nifong be- 
gan with a discovery law that the North Carolina legislature enacted in 
1996, which was applicable only to defendants convicted of capital murder 
and sentenced to death. North Carolina General Statutes § 15A-1415(f) 
 
John Oliver, whose life was spared because the trial court found a Brady violation long before the new 
discovery law was enacted. However, during the decades prior to the passage of the new law, only that 
case and one other death penalty case (McDowell) were reversed on Brady grounds, which contrasts 
with ten reversals in a little more than a decade after the discovery law became effective. Although these 
are small numbers, and the difference in numbers certainly could be explained by other factors, I argue 
that the increase in reversals strongly suggests that Brady became far more meaningful after defense 
attorneys gained automatic access to the full files of the prosecution and investigative agents to examine 
them for potentially exculpatory evidence. 
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provides that in such cases “[t]he State, to the extent allowed by law, shall 
make available to the capital defendant’s counsel the complete files of all 
law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of 
the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant.”12 
This provision may be called “open-file discovery,” which is accurate 
in one sense, but it provides far more than simply a requirement of the 
prosecutor to open his or her files. It entitles the defense also to have access 
to law enforcement files where evidence that even the prosecutor did not 
know about may be found. I therefore call the provision “full open-file dis- 
covery.” 
The statute was enacted as “An Act to Expedite the Postconviction 
Process in North Carolina.”13 Its theory, as stated by the North Carolina 
Supreme Court, was to provide “early and full disclosure to counsel for 
capital defendants so that they may raise all potential claims in a single 
motion for appropriate relief.”14 In the major test of the statute’s meaning, 
the State argued for a narrow construction, contending the work product 
privilege protected much of the prosecution’s files.15 
The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected this argument, giving the 
statute’s disclosure requirements an extremely broad reading and giving a 
narrow construction to work product protection. It stated that the prosecu- 
tion could withhold “only specific types of information which the State is 
elsewhere prohibited by law from disclosing.”16 The Supreme Court agreed 
with the trial judge that this statute “provides for broader discovery for a 
capital defendant’s counsel in the post conviction review process than pre- 
viously existed.”17 
This was North Carolina’s first experience with full open-file discov- 
ery in criminal cases. It changed the landscape for defendants who had been 
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death as described in the in- 
troduction. 
Specifically, it opened the investigative files in the prosecution of Alan 
Gell, who was sentenced to death at his initial trial in 1998. The files con- 
tained extraordinary exculpatory evidence—indeed, evidence that appeared 
to show Gell was an innocent man who had spent nine years in prison and 
half of that on death row.18 
 
12 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415(f) (2006) (emphasis added). 
13 State v. Bates, 497 S.E.2d 276, 277-78 (N.C. 1998) (noting the title of the act, which was rati- 
fied by the North Carolina legislature on June 21, 1996). 
14 Id. at 281. 
15 Id. at 277-78. 
16 Id. at 279 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-904(b)). The court cited the prohibition against the 
disclosure of confidential juvenile records without court order as an example of the type of exception 
contemplated by the statute. Id. 
17 Id. at 280 (quoting order of Superior Court Judge Melzer A. Morgan, Jr.). 
18 Joseph Neff, False Actions Charged in Trial: Gell’s Prosecutors Face Bar Inquiry, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 9, 2004. 
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B. The Gell Conviction and Grant of a New Trial During Post-Conviction 
Proceedings 
 
On April 14, 1995, the decomposing body of Allen Jenkins was dis- 
covered in his home in the small town of Aulander in northeastern North 
Carolina.19 Alan Gell was arrested and charged with Jenkins’s murder. He 
was convicted based exclusively on the testimony of Crystal Morris and 
Shanna Hall (ages 15 and 16), who themselves admitted involvement in the 
murder.20 Morris and Hall told investigators that they accompanied Gell to 
rob Jenkins and that the robbery-turned-murder occurred on April 3, 1995. 
That date was important in that Gell could not have committed the murder 
thereafter because he was either out of the state or in jail on other charges 
until Jenkins’ body was found.21 
In 1998, Gell was tried, convicted of capital murder, and sentenced to 
death.22 In October 2000, the full file was delivered by the State to Gell’s 
lawyers pursuant to the broad discovery law applicable on post-conviction 
review in death sentence cases. In the boxes of material, the lawyers found 
exculpatory information of two types that led to a new trial. They found 
interview reports by State Bureau of Investigation agents with multiple wit- 
nesses who stated they had seen the decedent alive after April 3.23 These 
included statements from the decedent’s brother, his across-the-street 
neighbor, and a life-long friend.24 As the subsequent trial showed, a number 
of these witnesses continued to believe they saw Jenkins alive after April 3 
and so testified.25 They also found a secretly recorded conversation between 
 
19 Hoke & Graves Disciplinary Order, supra note 1, ¶ 5. 
20 Report to the North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Review Committee at 1-2 (July 15, 2005) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Disciplinary Review Committee Report] (“There was no other evi- 
dence linking Gell to the crime.”). 
Both Morris and Hall entered guilty pleas to second degree murder and received nine year 
sentences in exchange for testifying. Anna Griffin, Death Row Interrupted: Alan Gell Was Condemned 
for a Crime He Didn’t Commit. He’s Free Now, and There’s Something He Has to Do, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (N.C.), Jan. 23, 2005, at 1E. Neff put the sentence at ten rather than nine years. Neff, supra 
note 18. 
21 Estes Thompson, Ex-Death Row Inmate Acquitted, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 19, 2004, at A3. 
22 Joseph Neff, Investigator in Gell Case Blames Prosecutors, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, 
N.C.), Mar. 18, 2005, at B7. 
23 See Hoke & Graves Disciplinary Order, supra note 1, ¶¶ 26, 30; Griffin, supra note 20. 
24 Joseph Neff, Chapter 1: Who Killed Allen Ray Jenkins?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), 
Dec. 8, 2002, http://newsobserver.com/news/crime_safety/deathrow/story/192028.html; Neff, supra 
note 18. 
25 See Cal Bryant, Unanswered Questions, ROANOKE-CHOWAN NEWS HERALD (N.C.), Feb. 24, 
2004, http://www.roanoke-chowannewsherald.com/articles/2004/02/23/opinion/column.txt (noting the 
role of the witnesses on retrial who said they saw Jenkins alive after April 3 as part of the extremely 
convincing case for acquittal on retrial); Joseph Neff, Lawyers Put Focus on Agent: Gell Prosecutors 
Deny Holding Data, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 22, 2004, at A1 (noting the “critical” 
value of the withheld witness statements and taped conversation for the jury in acquitting Gell). 
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Crystal Morris and her then-boyfriend in which Shanna Hall occasionally 
participated and, most significantly, in which Morris stated that she needed 
to “make up a story” to tell the police regarding the murder.26 
On December 9, 2002, Superior Court Judge Cy A. Grant, after a brief 
hearing, ruled from the bench that Gell should receive a new trial.27 In his 
three-page written order signed a week later, Judge Grant found that the 
State had failed to provide evidence of two types: first, statements to inves- 
tigators by a number of witnesses that they had seen the victim alive after 
April 3, 1995, and second, the secret tape recording of two of the state’s 
witnesses.28 He ruled that the statements and tape recording were exculpa- 
tory and material.29 In his order, Judge Grant made no reference to the 
knowledge or intent of the prosecutors, stating only that the trial judge had 
ordered the State to produce for in camera inspection by the court the 
statements of all witnesses who saw the victim alive after April 3, and that 
the State “did not comply with the trial court’s order.”30 
The Attorney General decided to retry Gell.31 After retrial, Gell was 
acquitted on February 18, 2004 on the first vote by his jury.32 
 
 
 
 
26 The taped conversation was a May 1995 telephone conversation between Crystal Morris and 
Gary Scott, her boyfriend at the time, which was recorded at the direction of SBI Agent Dwight Ran- 
some. Answer ¶ 8(a), N.C. State Bar v. Hoke, No. 04 DHC 15 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the 
N.C. State Bar Apr. 23, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hoke & Graves Answer]. The tape also 
included statements made by Shanna Hall, who can be heard on the tape yelling to Morris and Scott. See 
Motion for Appropriate Relief ¶¶ 143-145, 147, North Carolina v. James Alan Gell, Nos. 95 CRS 1884, 
1393-40, 2322, July 30, 2001 (on file with author). In the conversation, Morris made the “make up a 
story” comment. Neff, supra note 25. 
27 Griffin, supra note 20. 
28 Id. ¶¶ 17, 19-22, State v. Gell, Nos. 95 CRS 1884, 1939-40, 2322 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 
2002) (on file with author). The order was entered by Cy A. Grant. Id. at 3. 
29 Id. at 2. 
30 Id. ¶¶ 15-17. 
On November 26, 2003, Judge Grant entered another order denying “as a matter of law” Gell’s 
motion to dismiss the prosecution based on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. Order Denying Motion 
to Dismiss, Gell, Nos. 95 CRS 1884, 1939-40, 2322 (on file with author). Hoke and Graves noted that 
litigation and attached the order to their answer, Hoke & Graves Answer, supra note 26, at 24-25 & 
Exhibit E, apparently arguing that Judge Grant’s order constituted, by inference, a ruling that their 
misconduct was not intentional. 
31 Jim Coman, who later helped lead the investigation of the Duke Lacrosse case for the Attorney 
General, was one of the two Special Prosecutors who handled Gell’s retrial for the state. See Joseph 
Neff, Duke Prosecutor Treads Familiar Ground, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 21, 2007, at 
A1 (noting that Coman was lead prosecutor in the Gell case and that some of the same defense attorneys 
who had attempted to persuade him to drop those charges represented players charged in the Duke 
Lacrosse case). 
32 See Joseph Neff, Haunted, Gell Moves On, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 27, 2005, 
at D1; Neff, supra note 25 (noting the first-ballot acquittal). 
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C. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Former Special Prosecutors Hoke 
and Graves 
 
In March 2004, the Bar filed disciplinary charges against David Hoke 
and Debra Graves,33 the two attorneys who prosecuted Gell originally.34 
Neither was still with the attorney general’s office.35 
As noted above, the undisclosed exculpatory information was of two 
types. One involved statements from people who stated they had seen the 
victim alive after April 3, 1995. As part of pretrial proceedings, and without 
specific reference to this issue, the trial court entered an order on September 
7, 1997 for the prosecution to produce all exculpatory evidence.36 Despite 
the court’s initial order, no statements had been turned over.37 Shortly be- 
fore trial began, Gell’s defense counsel read in a local paper that three peo- 
ple had seen Jenkins in a nearby town a week after the date on which the 
prosecution contended he had been killed,38 and he filed a second request  
for exculpatory information, specifically requesting witness statements of 
all witnesses who saw the victim alive after the critical date.39 
On February 2, 1998, when the motion was addressed in court, the 
prosecutors responded that they were aware that statements had been made 
by people who reported seeing the decedent alive after April 3.40 However, 
those witnesses had been re-interviewed and had said they could not be 
specific on the time, so the prosecutors did not feel the statements were 
 
33 Complaint at 1, N.C. State Bar v. Hoke, No. 04 DHC 15 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the 
N.C. State Bar Mar. 29, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hoke Bar Complaint]. 
34 Hoke and Graves from the Attorney General’s office handled the case because the local district 
attorney’s office developed a conflict of interest when a new attorney was hired from the firm that was 
representing Gell. Letter from District David H. Beard, Jr., Dist. Attorney for Bertie County, to Bill 
Ferrell, N.C. Senior Deputy Attorney Gen. at 1-2 (Jan. 2, 1996), Hoke & Graves Answer, supra note 26, 
Exhibit A. 
35 By that time, Hoke was assistant director of the North Carolina Administrative Office of the 
Courts, which oversees operation of the state’s court system and Graves was a federal public defender in 
Raleigh, North Carolina. Charles Delafuente, Minimum Punishment Puts State Bar on Trial: Two 
Prosecutors Reprimanded for Withholding Evidence in Capital Case, 3 No. 44 A.B.A. J. E-Rep. 5 (Nov. 
5, 2004), available at 3 No. 44 ABAJEREP 5 (Westlaw). 
36 Hoke & Graves Bar Complaint, supra note 33, ¶ 6; Order ¶ 9, State v. Gell, Nos. 95 CRS 1884, 
1939-40, 2322 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2002) (on file with author); Hoke & Graves Answer, supra 
note 26, ¶ 7 (quoting the language of Judge Grant’s generally phrased Brady order entered as an oral 
ruling from the bench). 
37 Hoke & Graves Bar Complaint, supra note 33, ¶ 14. 
38 Motion for Production of Exculpatory Evidence ¶ 5, State v. Gell, Nos. 95 CRS 1884, 1939-40, 
2322 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gell Motion for Production]; 
Joseph Neff, Chapter 3: Gell Defense Left in the Dark, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 10, 
2002, http://www.newsobserver.com/news/crime_safety/deathrow/series/story/301508.html. 
39 Hoke & Graves Bar Complaint, supra note 33, ¶ 13. This motion was filed on January 30, 1998. 
Gell Motion For Production, supra note 38, at 1 (showing time stamp). 
40 Hoke & Graves Bar Complaint, supra note 33, ¶ 14. 
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exculpatory.41 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered the 
prosecutors to produce “the statements of any witness who allegedly saw 
the deceased after the date of the 3rd day of April, 1995, and let me review 
them.”42 After conferring with the lead investigator in the case, State Bu- 
reau of Investigation (“SBI”) Agent Dwight Ransome, the prosecutors gave 
statements regarding nine witnesses to the judge.43 In fact, at that time, the 
files contained statements from 18 witnesses who had said they saw the 
decedent alive after April 3.44 Several days later, another statement was 
located by the investigator and given to defense counsel.45 This left undis- 
closed statements regarding 8 witnesses.46 
The second type of potentially exculpatory evidence found by the 
judge and covered by the Bar’s Complaint was the withholding of a tape 
recorded conversation involving the two key prosecution witnesses, Morris 
and Hall. It was withheld “even though the recording contained matter that 
the court later concluded was exculpatory as a matter of law and was re- 
quired to be disclosed under the orders of the court and the constitutional 
obligations of the State.”47 
As to the undisclosed witness statements, the prosecutors responded 
that they were unaware that the date of death was an issue in the case until 
the morning of February 2, 1998.48 They initially contended that the file 
they used, which they had received from the local District Attorney, did not 
contain all the witness interviews that were in the SBI file,49 although they 
acknowledged they had received the full SBI file.50 Thus, as to the witness 
statements regarding seeing the decedent after April 3, they were unsure 
which of those statements might have been in their working file, but they 
argued they would likely not have recognized the potential exculpatory 
nature of the statements had they seen them because they were unaware the 
actual date of death was at issue.51 They responded that, after they received 
the specific directive regarding these statements, they relied upon Agent 
Ransome to review the files and to provide copies of the relevant state- 
 
 
 
41 Hoke & Graves Disciplinary Order, supra note 1, ¶ 24. 
42    Id. ¶ 25. 
43    Id. ¶ 27. 
44    Id. ¶ 26. 
45    Id. ¶ 31. 
46    Id. ¶ 27. 
47 Hoke & Graves Bar Complaint, supra note 33, ¶ 22. 
48 Hoke & Graves Answer, supra note 26, ¶ 5. 
49 Id. ¶ 3. 
50 Amended Answer ¶ 1, N.C. State Bar v. Hoke, No. 04 DHC 15 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n 
of the N.C. State Bar Sept. 9, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hoke & Graves Amended An- 
swer]. 
51 Hoke & Graves Answer, supra note 26, ¶ 8(b). 
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ments, and, therefore, their failure to comply with the orders was “uninten- 
tional and inadvertent on their part.”52 
With regard to the recorded statement, they asserted they had not lis- 
tened to the tape recording, but acknowledged knowing of the content of  
the transcript of it. They asserted that they believed it not to be Brady mate- 
rial: 
 
[I]t was their opinion that the transcript of that conversation which they had received did not 
qualify as Brady material, and since they were not intending to offer the tape itself, or a copy 
of the transcript of that conversation, as evidence at trial, they did not believe that they were 
required to produce that in response to a Brady Order. While they both recognized that the 
transcript of that conversation could, and more likely than not, would be of help in cross- 
examining Ms. Morris, it was not their belief that it was Brady material that was referred to 
in Judge Grant’s Order.53 
 
. . . . 
 
Upon reviewing the transcription of the tape in preparation for trial from late 1996 up to 
1998, it was the Defendants’ belief that this transcript did not contain “exculpatory” evidence 
for Ms. [sic] Gell, but, at best, constituted ammunition for impeachment on cross- 
examination of either Ms. Morris or Ms. Hall at trial. Since there was never a Motion filed in 
this matter pursuant to Giglio v. United States which would have called for such a disclosure, 
these Defendants did not believe they were under any obligation to produce this document to 
counsel for Mr. Gell.54 
 
At the Disciplinary Hearing Committee proceedings in September 
2004, the lawyers representing the North Carolina State Bar relied exclu- 
sively on the Complaint and the deposition of the prosecutors. They chose 
not to call any witnesses, which they explained was for strategic reasons 
since they believed the prosecutors had admitted conduct necessary to es- 
tablish the charges.55 The defense called numerous witnesses. 
 
52 Id.; Hoke & Graves Amended Answer, supra note 50, ¶ 2. 
53 Hoke & Graves Answer, supra note 26, ¶ 8(a) (emphasis in original). 
54 Hoke & Graves Answer, supra note 26, ¶ 22. In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), 
the Supreme Court first held that failure to provide information regarding an agreement with the gov- 
ernment about future prosecution was important to credibility and failure to produce it violated the Due 
Process Clause, id. at 154-55 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). In United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Court cited its decision in Giglio in stating that “[i]mpeachment evi- 
dence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule,” id. at 676. Indeed, the Court 
stated that it “has rejected any . . . distinction between exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence. 
Id. 
The inept efforts of the State to support the position that impeaching evidence was not Brady 
information was remarkable. Initially, Jim Coman, a major figure in the Attorney General’s office who 
prosecuted Gell at the retrial and who served as Special Prosecutor in the Duke Lacrosse case stated 
under oath that the Attorney General’s policy was not to treat impeaching evidence as Brady evidence. 
Joseph Neff, N.C. Prosecutors Stifled Evidence, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 19, 2004, at 
A1. He subsequently recanted his statement. Id. 
55 Disciplinary Review Committee Report, supra note 20, at 4. 
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The Disciplinary Hearing Committee generally accepted the factual 
claims of the defendants.56 It, however, found violations of the prosecutors’ 
duty to produce “evidence or information known to the prosecution that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused” under then existing North Carolina 
Rule 3.8(d),57 which tracked Model Rule 3.8(d).58 In reaching this conclu- 
sion, the panel made a somewhat innovative ruling that the prosecutors 
“had a duty under the Rules of Professional Conduct and existing case law 
to know the contents of the investigation files in the possession of the State 
and its agents.”59 The same conduct was found to be conduct prejudicial to 
the administration of justice under North Carolina Rule 8.4.60 It also found  
a failure to supervise the conduct of a non-lawyer (Agent Ransome), which 
it concluded was a violation of North Carolina Rule 5.3.61 The State Bar 
Complaint had also alleged that the prosecutors knowingly made a false 
statement of material fact to the court in violation of North Carolina Rule 
3.3,62 but the Disciplinary Hearing Committee did not find that violation.63 
 
 
 
 
56 Apparently, if witnesses had been called, some of them would have contradicted their explana- 
tions. Hoke and Graves asserted that they believed they need not provide witness statements since Beard 
had already provided the statements to defense counsel through his open-file policy, Hoke & Graves 
Answer, supra note 26, at 2, 19, and that the file Beard delivered to the attorney general’s office was 
incomplete, id. at 3. Beard would have contradicted those claims. Joseph Neff, Bar Set to Defend Its 
Ruling: Historic Hearing Slated in Gell Case, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 19, 2004, at A1. 
Hoke and Graves also claimed that they did not know the date of death was at issue until the day of trial. 
Hoke & Graves Answer, supra note 26, ¶ 5. Likewise, Dr. M.G.F. Gilliand, the medical examiner, 
would have contradicted that assertion by the prosecutors. Neff, supra. See generally Disciplinary 
Review Committee Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 11-12 (noting concerns about investigation in (1) not 
reviewing the original Gell prosecution files, (2) not interviewing or calling the former District Attorney 
once Hoke and Graves suggested he did not transmit witness statements to them, and (3) not considering 
using information from the medial examiner to challenge the credibility of Gell’s prosecutor’s, although 
the Committee believed these failures did not affect the hearing outcome). But see Joseph Neff, Gell’s 
Suit Gets a Boost: Ex-DA: Evidence Was Hidden, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 3, 2007 
(describing allegations by Gell’s attorneys in on-going civil suit, derived in part from a deposition of 
David Beard, the original prosecutor, that the defendant in the suit, SBI agent Dwight Ransome, kept 
exculpatory information from Hoke and Graves); infra note 303. 
57 N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2006). 
58 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983). 
59 Hoke & Graves Disciplinary Order, supra note 1, Conclusions of Law ¶ 2(a). 
60    Id. ¶ 2(c). 
61    Id. ¶ 2(b). 
62 Hoke & Graves Bar Complaint, supra note 33, ¶ 23(a) (alleging that “[b]y representing to the 
court that the State had produced all exculpatory witness statements pursuant to a direct order of the 
court when the Defendants knew or should have known that the statement was false, Defendants know- 
ingly made a false statement of material fact to a tribunal in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) and engaged in 
conduct involving misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c)”). 
63 Disciplinary Review Committee Report, supra note 20, at 4. 
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The Disciplinary Hearing Committee imposed a reprimand—a rela- 
tively mild form of punishment.64 In that reprimand, it stated that there was 
“no clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that [the prosecutors’] conduct 
was intentional.”65 
The disciplinary hearing and its result created a furor among members 
of the legal profession in North Carolina. Protests over the action swamped 
the State Bar President Dudley Humphrey. In response, the State Bar 
scheduled an unprecedented public meeting the next month to explain its 
action to critics.66 However, the meeting did little to resolve complaints.67 
University of North Carolina Law Professor Rich Rosen called the public 
hearing “a whitewash of a whitewash” and characterized the presentation of 
the chair of the State Bar Grievance Committee as “a filibuster.”68 No ques- 
tions were taken from the floor, and Rosen found the presentation a justifi- 
cation rather than an explanation.69 
 
 
64 Cf. Delafuente, supra note 35 (stating that the punishment was “the lightest penalty available”). 
The Disciplinary Hearing Committee had available two milder forms of punishment: an admonition, see 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28(c)(4)-(5) (2006) (describing a reprimand as more serious than an admonition), 
and a letter of warning, see N.C. STATE BAR R. 1B.0103(30) (2003) (describing a letter of warning as a 
written communication regarding “an unintentional, minor, or technical violation of the Rules of Profes- 
sional Conduct [that] may be the basis for discipline if continued or repeated”). 
As noted by Joseph Neff, a long-time reporter for the The News & Observer, even before the 
hearing was conducted, substantial Bar discipline has not been the order of the day for prosecutorial 
misconduct. Neff, supra note 18. “In four decades of disciplining lawyers, the State Bar has punished 
only two prosecutors for withholding evidence. Both were put on a form of probation, in which they 
could continue to practice law as long as they broke no more laws and consulted with a mentor.” Id. One 
such disciplinary action involved Gary B. Goodman who secured a death sentence against Stephen Mark 
Bishop that was vacated because of a Brady violation. See Memorandum Order and Final Opinion at 21, 
State v. Bishop, Nos. 93 CRS 20410-23, slip op. at 21 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000) (on file with 
author). For this and two other Brady violations, Goodman’s license was suspended for two years. Order 
of Discipline, Conclusions of Law ¶ 2, N.C. State Bar v. Goodman, No. 00 DHC 29 (Disciplinary Hear- 
ing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar Mar. 26, 2001) (on file with author). However, his suspension was 
stayed based on several compliance conditions, which included no further violation of the North Caro- 
lina State Bar and Discipline Rules and consulting with a mentor once a month during the stayed sus- 
pension. Id. Order of Discipline ¶ 1. 
65 Hoke & Graves Reprimand, supra note 1. 
The Bar’s report, while not explicitly disputing that a non-intentional ethical violation occurred, 
does note that the prosecutors “made a conscious decision to not turn over the transcript to defense 
counsel, believing it was not properly Brady material.” Disciplinary Review Committee Report, supra 
note 20, at 4. Moreover, Hoke’s sworn statement, elicited by the Bar’s lawyer on cross-examination, 
indicated that in 1993 he had been admonished by a judge in a murder trial when he “told the judge he 
didn’t turn it over because it was ‘impeaching evidence, not exculpatory evidence.’” Neff, supra note 
54. 
66 Neff, supra note 56. 
67 Joseph Neff, Bar Hearing Provokes More Anger, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 21, 
2004, at B1. 
68 Delafuente, supra note 35. 
69 Id. 
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D. Disciplinary Rule Reform 
 
The State Bar responded to the continuing controversy by announcing 
in December 2004 the formation of a special committee to review the disci- 
plinary action and to examine whether ethics rules or disciplinary proce- 
dures should be revised.70 The resulting Disciplinary Review Committee 
Report stated that Rule 3.8 of the North Carolina Rules of Professional 
Conduct “does not make the failure to provide what is known as Brady ma- 
terial unethical unless such material deals directly with innocence or mitiga- 
tion; nor does it require that the prosecution diligently seek out such infor- 
mation.”71 The first part of that statement—that Brady material must di- 
rectly deal with innocence or mitigation—appears to be an overstatement of 
the clarity of the exculpatory quality of the evidence since Rule 3.8(d) re- 
quires disclosure of evidence that simply “tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused.”72 The second part—that the prosecution can be willfully igno- 
rant—was rejected, as the committee noted, by the Disciplinary Hearing 
Committee’s decision. The Report recommended changes in the discipli- 
nary rule relating to the Brady duty. It specifically proposed a duty by 
prosecutors to “inquire into and search for the existence of such material in 
order to fulfill their ethical obligations.”73 
As a result of the disciplinary action in the Gell case, the North Caro- 
lina State Bar amended the provision defining the duty of the prosecutor 
 
 
70 Press Release, N.C. State Bar, State Bar Forms Disciplinary Committee,(Dec. 13, 2004) (on file 
with author); see also Joseph Neff et al., Hoke-Graves Case Prompts State Bar Review, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 19, 2005, at B5 (describing work of special committee charged with 
examining how the State Bar handled the Hoke and Graves disciplinary hearing). 
71 Disciplinary Review Committee Report, supra note 20, at 9. 
72 The committee perhaps was referring to an argument related to the materiality concept of 
Brady. See infra note 185. Former Supreme Court Justice Robert Orr argued before the review commit- 
tee that the prosecutors did not err in withholding the tape recorded statement of the key witnesses 
regarding making up a story for the police because “‘had this issue reached the N.C. Supreme Court, 
failure to turn it [the tape] over’ would not have won Gell a new trial.” Neff, supra note 22. While the 
disciplinary rule has no requirement that the evidence be such that it would likely have affected the 
outcome of the trial through its requirement of a knowing violation, it does effectively have a require- 
ment that the exculpatory quality be clear enough that it can be discerned by the prosecutor. 
Prosecutors sometimes make a related argument that they may withhold apparently helpful 
evidence to the defense (arguably exculpatory evidence) because they judge it to be non-material in that 
it would not be sufficiently likely effect the trial outcome for the Constitution to mandate disclosure. As 
to the constitutional doctrine, that argument is theoretically sound, but it would appear to be problematic 
in many cases as a practical matter. It would appear difficult for a prosecutor at the discovery stage to 
have confidence in how evidence that is facially helpful to the defense would affect the outcome of the 
future trial as the actual evidence unfolds there. In some cases at least, this argument is likely more a 
retrospective excuse for the nondisclosure rather than a carefully considered reason. Materiality is not 
apparently an excuse under the ethics rules. 
73 Disciplinary Review Committee Report, supra note 20, at 12. 
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under Rule 3.8(d), effective November 16, 2006.74 It changed the Discipli- 
nary Rule in two ways. First, the introductory phrase “after reasonably dili- 
gent inquiry” was added at the beginning of Rule 3.8(d), which imposes a 
requirement of diligence to learn of potentially exculpatory information. 
Second, it expanded the ethical duty of disclosure beyond “all evidence or 
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused or mitigates the offense” to include a duty to “make timely disclo- 
sure to the defense of all evidence or information required to be disclosed 
by applicable law, rules of procedure, or court opinions.” 
 
E. Discovery Reform 
 
The Gell case also prompted the North Carolina Legislature to create a 
vastly different discovery regime. After the acquittal of Alan Gell, politi- 
cally powerful State Senator Tony Rand gave the organizations represent- 
ing the prosecutors and defense attorneys an ultimatum: Work out an open 
file discovery bill or the legislature would pass one on its own.75 The adver- 
saries hammered out a deal.76 
Prior to the changes described above, North Carolina had quite limited 
criminal discovery system, which historically was the pattern across the 
nation. Criminal discovery has lagged behind civil discovery throughout 
our nation’s history. In many ways, having a narrower discovery system in 
criminal cases where the stakes are often higher than in civil cases seems 
backwards if, as is ordinarily assumed, discovery is a way to improve accu- 
racy. However, more restrictive criminal discovery has been the result 
reached based on asserted differences between civil and criminal trials. 
The various substantive positions in the historical debate have been 
developed at length. I will only briefly summarize them here. The side op- 
posing broader discovery, which in the main means broader disclosure by 
 
74 As amended, Rule 3.8(d) reads in full: 
after reasonably diligent inquiry, make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or in- 
formation required to be disclosed by applicable law, rules of procedure, or court opinions 
including all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt  
of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the 
defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigation information known to the prosecutor, 
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tri- 
bunal. 
N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2006) (amended provisions emphasized). 
75 Joseph Neff, “Open File” Law Gives Defense a Tool to Force Out Evidence, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 12, 2007, at A18 (describing receipt of handwritten letter from Alan 
Gell to The News & Observer in which Gell stated: “‘I feel like each [Duke Lacrosse] player needs to 
send me a thank-you card for making that discovery law!!’” and setting out the history that led to the 
discovery statute). 
76 Id.; see also Matthew Eisley, Three Bills Push N.C. Prosecutors to Share Evidence, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 29, 2004, at A1 (noting impact of Gell case); Matthew Eisley, “We’re 
Going to Have Fairer Trials,” NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 13, 2004, at B1 (same). 
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the prosecution, advances three arguments: first, broader discovery permits 
criminal defendants to develop effective perjured testimony to meet the 
revealed details the prosecution will offer; second, broad disclosures will 
reveal identifying information regarding prosecution witnesses and will 
permit witness intimidation; and third, because the defendant is protected 
by the Fifth Amendment, reciprocal disclosures required of the defense will 
inevitably be more limited.77 Further summarized, the traditional argument 
against further discovery is that broader discovery tilts the balance of ad- 
vantage, which already favors the defendant because of various procedural 
protections such as the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, too 
far or unfairly to the benefit of the defendant. 
The response of those favoring more liberal discovery has been to 
make an offer to provide rather broad reciprocal defense discovery and to 
mount the same basic argument that prevailed in civil discovery that open- 
ness leads to greater accuracy.78 Although the justifications are complex  
and multifaceted, the general result has been a modest but steady movement 
in the direction of liberalization in criminal discovery over the decades.79 
Recently, as illustrated in North Carolina, the proponents of liberal 
discovery have supported their arguments by forceful arguments regarding 
the need to protect innocent individuals, as the Gell case and subsequently 
the Duke Lacrosse case illustrate. One cannot be certain of the origins of 
the current innocence movement, but it certainly gathered strength from a 
set of exonerations that came from DNA evidence applied to convictions 
obtained before such technology was available.80 Arguments about inno- 
cence certainly do not answer all the arguments about balance of advantage, 
which I do not mean to dismiss out of hand, against broader discovery and a 
movement toward full open-file discovery. However, concerns for the inno- 
cent are a powerful counterweight. 
One of the most famous statements/rants against broad discovery in 
criminal cases came from Judge Learned Hand: “Why . . . [the defendant] 
should in advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over at his 
leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see 
. . . . Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent 
man convicted. It is an unreal dream.”81 Gell lived what Hand asserted was 
an unreal dream. Proof of innocent defendants being convicted have at least 
somewhat altered perceptions, and Hand’s statement is somewhat a relic of 
the past. In its strident form at least, it could not survive the DNA exonera- 
 
77 See generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.1(b) (2d ed. 1999). 
78 See generally id. § 20.1(b), (d). 
79 See generally id. § 20.1(c) (noting that “proponents of liberal defense discovery have been the 
clear ‘winners’”). 
80 See Robert P. Mosteller, Evidence History, the New Trace Evidence, and Rumblings in the 
Future of Proof, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 535-36 (2006). 
81 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). 
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tions of the 1990s, and I contend it would not be the sentiment of those who 
watched the Duke Lacrosse case unfold. 
Over the past several decades, the debate regarding the scope of dis- 
covery has resulted in a range of statutory provisions across the nation. 
They may be visualized as having on one side the basic federal model of 
Rule 16,82 which provides that the defendants, other than their own state- 
ments and criminal record, are entitled to a limited list of evidence that is 
either material to the defense or that the prosecution intends to introduce in 
its case in chief.83 On the other end of the spectrum are states that have 
adopted various versions of the American Bar Association’s proposed stan- 
dards.84 Although operating with its own quite distinctive system, Florida’s 
system has long been seen as providing the most extensive range of infor- 
mation for the defense.85 
Professor Jerold Israel has noted that the Second Edition of the ABA 
Standards proposed open-file discovery that “extended to ‘all the material 
and information within the prosecutor’s possession or control.’ So far, how- 
ever, not even the most liberal discovery jurisdiction has been willing to 
adopt such an open-ended provision . . . .”86 Although North Carolina used 
slightly different wording, it enacted an expansive open-file discovery 
law.87 It moved, first as to death penalty cases on post-conviction review 
 
82 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. 
83 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (allowing disclosure under specified provisions of documents and ob- 
jects, reports of examinations and tests, and expert witnesses but allowing discovery of the statements of 
government witnesses only under the “Jencks Act,” 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), which provides them only 
after the witness testifies at trial). 
84 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 
(1st ed. 1970); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 
(2d ed. 1980); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY (3d ed. 1996). 
85 See, e.g., Tamara L. Graham, Comment, Death by Ambush: A Plea for Discovery of Evidence in 
Aggravation, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 321, 339-42 (2005) (describing Florida as being at the liberal end of the 
scale in providing discovery for the defense and Virginia at the other, still following the traditional 
model of quite limited discovery). 
I have something of a confession to offer with regard to discovery. In my first article as an 
academic, I argued against imposing reciprocal discovery on the defense, which is a component of the 
North Carolina system and most that are liberally oriented. Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the 
Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1567 (1986). A mandatory reciprocal system 
can take from the defense its ability to maintain control of the product of its investigation without pro- 
viding many benefits. See Graham, supra, at 340-41. The North Carolina system imposes reciprocal 
duties on the defense, but it provides substantial benefits in return. Even from the perspective that I 
adopted in Tilting the Adversarial Balance, the balance of costs to benefits for the typical defendant and 
for accuracy of results comes out well. 
86 4 LAFAVE, supra note 77, § 20.1(c). The North Carolina statute attempts to deal with problems 
that may occur regarding the meaning of “within the prosecutor’s possession or control” by the statutory 
requirement that the prosecution to provide the defense with law enforcement files and by subsequent 
legislation enforcing the responsibility of law enforcement to provide those files to the prosecution. See 
infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
87 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (2005). 
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and then as to all defendants, from a very traditional jurisdiction with lim- 
ited discovery88 to very near the other end of the discovery spectrum. 
The new discovery law enacted after Gell’s acquittal requires that, 
upon motion, the court must order the prosecution to “[m]ake available to 
the defendant the complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial 
agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the 
prosecution of the defendant.”89 The term “file” is broadly defined to in- 
clude statements by defendants or codefendants and “witness statements, 
investigating officers’ notes, results of tests and examinations, or any other 
matter or evidence obtained during the investigation . . . .”90 It mandates  
that “[o]ral statements shall be in written or recorded form.”91 Like the pro- 
vision enacted earlier that was applicable to post-conviction litigation in 
death penalty cases, this is “full open-file discovery” in the sense that the 
prosecution is responsible for providing the defense, not only with the ma- 
terial that it has in its file, but also with relevant materials in the files of law 
enforcement agencies, which it may never have seen or possessed.92 
As to experts, the statute requires that the prosecution give the defen- 
dant notice of any expert it reasonably expects to call as a witness, and it 
requires that the expert prepare, and the prosecution furnish to the defen- 
dant, “a report of the results of any examinations or tests conducted by the 
expert” and the “expert’s curriculum vitae, the expert’s opinion, and the 
 
 
88 See, e.g., State v. Hardy, 235 S.E.2d 828, 839-42 (N.C. 1977) (describing the origins of the 
State’s discovery law in the federal discovery rule and limitations on disclosure statements of prosecu- 
tion witnesses); State v. Cunningham, 423 S.E.2d 802, 808-09 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (describing the 
close relationship between the North Carolina’s discovery system and Federal Rule 16). 
89 § 15A-903 (a)(1). For a summary of its provisions, see John Rubin, 2004 Legislation Affecting 
Criminal Law and Procedure, 2004 ADMIN. JUST. BULL 6, 4-6, available at http://www.iogcriminal.unc. 
edu/aoj.htm. 
90 § 15A-903 (a)(1). 
91 Id. In State v. Shannon, 642 S.E.2d 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals rejected the State’s argument for a narrow construction of the term “statement” and held that it 
applied, inter alia, to oral statements made by witnesses to prosecutors, which they are required to take 
down in written form and produce under the new discovery statute, id. at 522-26. The Disciplinary 
Hearing Committee concluded that Nifong did not violate one of the charges against him that related to 
his failure to record the statements made by Dr. Meehan during their meetings because he may have 
been relying on the Attorney General’s position that the statute did not require a prosecutor to make 
such recordings. Excerpt Transcript Findings of Fact, supra note 4, at 7-8. But see Amended Nifong Bar 
Order, supra note 3, Conclusions of Law (c), at 21 (concluding that Nifong violated former Rule 3.4(d) 
because he failed to provide defendants with a complete report that included written or recorded memo- 
rializations of certain oral statements). 
92 Effective December 2007, a new provision was added to the statute, § 15A 903(c), which pro- 
vides, “Upon request by the State, a law enforcement or prosecutorial agency shall make available to the 
State a complete copy of the complete files related to the investigation of the crimes committed or the 
prosecution of the defendant for compliance with this section and any disclosure under G.S. 15A- 
902(a).” 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 183. The statute gives force to the prosecution’s request for investigative 
agency files. 
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underlying basis for that opinion.”93 The notice and the materials are to be 
furnished “within a reasonable time prior to trial, as specified by the 
court.”94 
The effect of the law, combined with the ethics requirement of making 
“timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information required to 
be disclosed by applicable law,”95 is to add specificity to the disclosure re- 
quirements of the disciplinary rules. Rather than exculpatory information, 
which may be disputed, the law and the disciplinary rule now require the 
production of the full files of the prosecution and investigative agencies. 
 
II. DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST DISTRICT ATTORNEY KENNETH 
HONEYCUTT AND ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY SCOTT BREWER 
ARISING FROM THE CAPITAL PROSECUTION OF JONATHAN GREGORY 
HOFFMAN 
 
The second of the three ethics prosecutions in recent years against 
prosecutors has less direct pertinence to the discipline of Nifong than the 
Gell matter, but it illustrates some important common elements and high- 
lights some frequent difficulties with disciplinary actions against prosecu- 
tors. 
The disciplinary action against former District Attorney Kenneth 
Honeycutt and former Assistant District Attorney Scott Brewer,96 prosecu- 
tors for a group of four counties just east of Charlotte,97 arose from their 
prosecution of Jonathan Gregory Hoffman. Hoffman was charged with 
capital murder for the November 1995 shotgun slaying of Marshville jew- 
elry store owner Danny Cook.98 The disciplinary charge was, in essence, 
that the two prosecutors misrepresented the extent of the inducements given 
to an important witness for the prosecution, Johnell Porter,99 who was fac- 
ing a significant period of incarceration for separate criminal conduct. 
 
93 § 15A-903(a)(2). 
94 Id. 
95 N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2006). 
96 Complaint ¶ 7, N.C. State Bar v. Brewer, No. 05 DHC 37 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the 
N.C. State Bar Aug. 30, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint]. 
By the time the complaint was dismissed on “statute of limitations” grounds in January 2006, Honeycutt 
was in private practice in Union County and Brewer was a state district court judge in Rockingham, 
North Carolina. Joseph Neff, Invalid Rule Spares Former Prosecutors from Discipline, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 21, 2006, at A1. 
97 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 4 (noting that both men practiced in the 
20th Judicial District, which is made up of Anson, Richmond, Stanley, and Union counties). 
98 Id. ¶ 6. 
99 In his testimony at Porter’s sentencing hearing in federal court, Honeycutt testified that “with- 
out him [Porter], we do not believe we would have had the successful prosecution.” Transcript of Sen- 
tencing Proceedings ¶¶ 4-5, United States v. Porter, No. 3:95CR190-02 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 25, 1996) (on 
file with author). In his letter to the federal prosecutor, Honeycutt likewise wrote: “Porter made a force- 
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At the time of the negotiations for his testimony, Porter was awaiting 
sentencing in federal court in the Western District of North Carolina (Char- 
lotte) after entering a guilty plea to robbing a bank in the Charlotte suburb 
of Huntersville.100 He was facing a presumptively consecutive sentence in 
South Carolina on an earlier conviction.101 Finally, he had been involved in 
drug related offenses and a number of other crimes in the Charlotte area and 
faced possible prosecution.102 Porter, who is Hoffman’s cousin, ultimately 
agreed to testify against Hoffman. He testified that Hoffman had admitted 
committing the murder.103 
All the parties agree that at a meeting on October 17, 1996, “Porter 
agreed to testify against Hoffman and [then-District Attorney] Honeycutt 
agreed to testify at Porter’s federal sentencing hearing regarding Porter’s 
‘substantial assistance.’” This agreement was made in writing, and a copy 
provided to Hoffman’s attorney before trial.104 
The Bar Complaint alleges that prior to trial, the trial court had entered 
an order requiring disclosure of promises or inducements to prosecution 
witnesses105 and that, in response, at the start of the trial, Honeycutt in- 
 
ful and compelling witness. A conviction in this case would probably not have been possible but for 
Johnell Porter’s testimony.” Letter from Kenneth W. Honeycutt, Dist. Attorney for Union County, to 
Brian Whisler, Assistant U.S. Attorney at 2 (Nov. 19, 1996), Exhibits to Third Amended Hoffman 
MAR, supra note 8, Exhibit 4.40. 
100 Order, Findings of Fact ¶¶ 5-6, State v. Hoffman, Nos. 95 CRS 15695-97 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 
30, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hoffman New Trial Order]; Third Amendment to Defen- 
dant’s Motion for Appropriate Relief at 22, Hoffman, Nos. 95 CRS 15695-97 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 
2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Third Amendment to Hoffman MAR]. 
101 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.3(a) (2006) (requiring that the federal 
sentence run consecutively to that of the instant offense when the instant offense was committed after 
sentencing in the unrelated case). 
102 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 11. The Bar asserted that the South 
Carolina charge was pending. Id. Honeycutt’s Answer asserted that Porter had already been sentenced in 
the South Carolina case, had been erroneously released, and had been notified that he would be required 
to serve the remainder of that sentence. Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Motion to Dismiss of Ken- 
neth W. Honeycutt ¶ 5(b), N.C. State Bar v. Brewer, No. 05 DHC 37 (Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of 
the N.C. State Bar Oct. 27, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Honeycutt Answer]. The Bar alleged 
that at the time of the negotiation, Porter was facing drug-related charges in Mecklenburg County. 
Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 11. Honeycutt’s Answer asserts that while he did 
not know of the charges, records indicate that they were dismissed on October 9, 1996, and thus would 
have been pending at the time of the October 4 meeting, but not at the time of the October 17 meeting. 
Honeycutt Answer, supra, ¶ 5(c). 
Regardless of the technical accuracy or inaccuracy of the State Bar’s pleading, Porter had 
extensive state and federal exposure to prosecution. During his testimony against Hoffman, Porter 
confessed to numerous armed robberies and attempted robberies, multiple crimes involving possession 
of a firearm, cocaine sale, and credit card fraud. Third Amendment to Hoffman MAR, supra note 100, at 
62 (reciting offense and setting out page references to Porter’s testimony). 
103 N.C. State Bar v. Brewer, 644 S.E.2d 573, 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
104 Id. at 574. 
105 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 25. 
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formed the trial court, in Brewer’s presence, that the State had revealed its 
only concessions and immunity agreement made to Porter in exchange for 
Porter’s testimony, which consisted of Honeycutt’s commitment to testify 
at Porter’s federal sentencing hearing that Porter had provided the prosecu- 
tion with “substantial assistance.”106 Porter then testified at trial that the  
only concession he was granted in exchange for his testimony was that 
agreement,107 and during closing argument Honeycutt and Brewer made this 
same representation.108 A jury convicted Hoffman of first-degree murder on 
November 13, 1996, sentencing him to death the next day.109 
The North Carolina State Bar’s principal claim was that Honeycutt and 
Brewer made four additional promises to Porter to secure Porter’s testi- 
mony and concealed these from his defense counsel. Specifically, the Bar 
alleged that Honeycutt (with Brewer’s knowledge and complicity) promised 
Porter: (1) immunity from federal prosecution on other alleged offenses 
(other than murder), (2) assistance in having a sentence on an unrelated 
conviction in the South Carolina state system to run concurrently with his 
federal bank robbery sentence, (3) immunity from prosecution in the Char- 
lotte area for pending or not yet charged cases, and (4) assistance in benefit- 
ing financially from a reward fund established by the friends and relatives 
of the victim.110 
The Bar Complaint alleged that all these commitments, which were 
explicit, were made at an October 17, 1996 meeting with Porter at the 
Mecklenburg County jail that included Brewer, Honeycutt, Brian Whisler, 
the Assistant United States Attorney handling Porter’s federal bank robbery 
case, and Aaron Michael, Porter’s defense attorney in that case.111 The facts 
supporting these charges came to light in the post-conviction review of 
Hoffman’s death sentence. In a series of amended complaints, counsel for 
 
106 Id. ¶ 46. 
107 Porter’s description of the deal was elicited by a series of leading questions. For example, 
“Does this agreement, State’s Exhibit 34, set forth all of the conditions and all concessions or promises 
that have been made to you about testifying in this case?” (objection overruled) and “And that is what is 
essentially contained in State’s exhibit 34?” Trial Transcript of October 31, 1996 at 1664-65, Exhibits to 
Third Amended Hoffman MAR, supra note 8, Exhibit 4.10(e). 
108 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 46. 
For example, in his closing argument, Brewer told the jury that Porter “told you things he hasn’t 
been charged with. That which he has no deals on, no deals of any sort.” Trial Transcript of November 
12, 1996 at 2494, Exhibits to Third Amended Hoffman MAR, supra note 8, Exhibit 4.10(g). 
109 N.C. State Bar v. Brewer, 644 S.E.2d 573, 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
110 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Dismissal Order, supra note 2, at 2. The complaint alleged: 
Honeycutt indicated that Porter would be rewarded for his cooperation in the Hoffman trial. 
The ‘rewards’ offered by Honeycutt included immunity from state and federal prosecution 
for other offenses, assistance obtaining payment from the South Carolina reward fund and a 
downward departure on Porter’s federal bank robbery sentence. Honeycutt also agreed to 
help Porter with Porter’s South Carolina conviction and sentence in return for Porter’s testi- 
mony against Hoffman. 
Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 28. 
111 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶¶ 27-28. 
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Hoffman catalogued the discovery of additional promises and inducements 
beyond the disclosed agreement for Honeycutt to testify at the federal sen- 
tencing regarding Porter “substantial assistance.”112 
Because no trial occurred on the disciplinary charges, the strength of 
the State Bar’s claim that Honeycutt made explicit promises, a contention 
that would have turned on credibility determinations, has not been adjudi- 
cated.113 Honeycutt’s Answer to the Complaint strongly contests the allega- 
tions, arguing, inter alia, that SBI Agent Tony Underwood was also present 
at that meeting and stated in an affidavit filed with the State Bar that the 
alleged promises were not made.114 The State Bar Complaint does not give 
the source of its evidence that explicit commitments were made at that 
meeting. However, attached to the third amendment to Hoffman’s post- 
conviction petition, called in North Carolina a Motion for Appropriate Re- 
lief [MAR], is an affidavit of Porter’s defense counsel in the federal prose- 
cution, Aaron E. Michel.115 Michel was undoubtedly the source.116 
In that affidavit regarding the October 17, 1996 meeting, which he at- 
tended, Michel states: 
 
Mr. Honeycutt said, in so many words, that Mr. Porter could rely on them to reward his co- 
operation. This reward included the downward departure in his federal sentence, efforts to 
help him with his South Carolina conviction and sentence, the reward money Mr. Ferris [the 
reward fund administrator] was holding, and immunity from both state and federal prosecu- 
tion. Mr. Porter agreed to these terms and the same day I called the prosecutor in Chester 
County [South Carolina] and the South Carolina Department of Corrections about his South 
Carolina conviction, and talked to Mr. Ferris about the reward money. I also exchanged mes- 
sages with Mr. Whisler to report my efforts concerning concessions from South Carolina.117 
 
 
 
112 Brewer, 644 S.E.2d at 575. The third amendment to Hoffman’s post-conviction pleading, which 
in North Carolina is called a Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR), was filed on October 9, 2003. Id. 
The MAR alleged, inter alia, that Honeycutt and Brewer had presented false testimony and had failed to 
correct Porter’s false testimony. Id. 
113 On July 25, 2007, a Special Prosecutor assigned to determine whether criminal charges should 
be brought against Honeycutt and Brewer based on the conduct alleged in the State Bar Complaint 
issued his report, declining to prosecute. Report of the Special Prosecutor Howard R. Greeson Jr. at 26, 
38 (July 25, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Special Prosecutor’s Report]. The Special Prosecu- 
tor stated that any prosecution would turn on the credibility of Aaron Michel, Porter’s defense attorney, 
and cites the lack of ability to corroborate his assertions as a major reason why he determined no 
charges should be brought. Id. at 26-34. In conclusion, the Special Prosecutor stated that “it has not been 
with the purview of this report to indicate or intimate that the accusations were true or untrue—only 
whether they could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,” which he determined “highly unlikely.” Id. at 
39. 
114 Honeycutt Answer, supra note 102, ¶ 21. 
115 Affidavit of Aaron E. Michel (Sept. 12, 2003), Exhibits to Third Amended Hoffman MAR, 
supra note 8, Exhibit 4.9A [hereinafter Michel Affidavit]. 
116 See Special Prosecutor’s Report, supra note 113, at 26 (describing Michel as the witness upon 
whose credibility the prosecution would turn and Porter as a supporting, but compromised, witness). 
117 Michel Affidavit, supra note 115, at 6-7. 
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The State Bar’s allegations were also supported by circumstantial evi- 
dence. First, the Bar Complaint notes that Brian Whisler, the Assistant 
United States Attorney, wrote an immunity letter to Porter on October 21, 
1996, which was not disclosed to defense counsel.118 This letter was written 
four days after the meeting at the Mecklenburg County jail. Second, his 
federal sentence and his South Carolina sentence were set to run concur- 
rently.119 Third, the charges pending against Porter in Mecklenburg County 
were dismissed and no new charges were filed.120 In addition, in November 
1996, Honeycutt wrote to the South Carolina reward fund regarding Por- 
ter’s assistance, and he received a substantial sum from the fund.121 
As a separate allegation of wrongdoing, which also provides circum- 
stantial support for the central allegation of an explicit commitment to Por- 
ter, the Bar Complaint notes that on October 30 and October 31, 1996, 
Judge William H. Helms ordered Honeycutt and Brewer to provide the 
court with copies of “‘any statements of any kind that [Porter] had made . . . 
whether it’s in written form, tape recorded or any other form’ including 
Honeycutt’s own interview notes.”122 It alleges that the two prosecutors did 
not comply and further charges that they falsely told the judge that they had 
done so.123 
The State Bar bases these additional charges on five documents in- 
volving a number of additional contacts with Porter. Four are notes of law 
enforcement and prosecutorial interviews or meetings with Porter on March 
29, September 6, October 4, and October 17, 1996,124 which were not pro- 
 
 
118 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶¶ 31, 33. 
119    Id. ¶ 50. 
120    Id. ¶ 52. 
121 Id. ¶¶ 48, 51. The exact amount is not given in any available document. Porter would say no 
more than that it was “less than $10,000” to Hoffman’s defense. Affidavit of Elizabeth Hambourger ¶ 7 
(July 29, 1999), Exhibits to Third Amended Hoffman MAR, supra note 8, Exhibit 4 (memorializing  
July 26, 1999 interview with Porter). 
122 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 37. The quotation shown came from the 
October 31 statement of Judge Helms. Trial Transcript of October 31, 1996 at 1631-32, Exhibits to 
Third Amended Hoffman MAR, supra note 8, Exhibit 4.10(d); see also Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Com- 
plaint, supra note 96, ¶ 36 (referring to a similar direction of the judge on October 30, 1996); Trial 
Transcript of October 30, 1996 at 1589, Exhibits to Third Amended Hoffman MAR, supra note 8, 
Exhibit 4.10(c) (showing Judge Helms’ direction that “[i]f he [Porter] made any statement that was 
recorded in any fashion give it to them”). 
123 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 34 (alleging that the prosecutors did not 
reveal notes regarding contacts with Porter on March 29, September 6, October 4, and October 17 to 
Hoffman’s attorneys); id. ¶ 38 (alleging that Brewer, in Honeycutt’s presence, falsely told the trial judge 
that the State had provided defense counsel with all statements made by Porter and Honeycutt’s notes); 
id. Charges ¶¶ (d)-(e) (alleging rule violations based on this conduct). 
124 Id. Exhibits 1-3 (showing notes of March 29, September 6, and October 4, 1996 contacts); 
Exhibits to Third Amended Hoffman MAR, supra note 8, Exhibit 4.18 (showing notes of October 17, 
1996 contact). Although none of these notes indicate any additional deal had been made, they do show 
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vided to the judge in response to his directives.125 Moreover, the final sen- 
tence was omitted from the version of a four-page typed document regard- 
ing an early October 1996 meeting with Porter that was provided to the 
judge.126 Under the heading of “Things To Do Ref. Porter,” the omitted 
sentence reads: “Meet With Us Att. And Get Some Concessions Made To 
Porter In The Event He Testifies.”127 That sentence appeared in a different 
version of that same document that post-conviction counsel found when 
inspecting the prosecutors’ files provided in discovery.128 A blank space 
appears in its place in the version provided to Judge Helms.129 
Honeycutt and Brewer denied that they knew of the federal immunity 
agreement until after the Hoffman trial.130 They did acknowledge that 
Honeycutt told Porter that if he testified truthfully Honeycutt would report 
his assistance to the Reward Fund but argued he had no control over the 
Fund and his statement was the same as made to any witness for the State 
who inquired about the Fund.131 
 
 
Porter’s concerns with other legal problems, such as the South Carolina sentence, and his various con- 
cerns regarding the federal case. 
125 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 38 (alleging that Brewer, in Honeycutt’s 
presence, falsely told the trial judge that the State had provided defense counsel with all statements 
made by Porter and Honeycutt’s notes). 
126 Id. Exhibit 5, at 4; see also id. ¶ 40 (describing the copy produced as redacted, Brewer & 
Honeycutt Bar Exhibit 4, and the version shown in the text as from the unredacted version, Exhibit 5); 
id. ¶ 41(noting failure to tell the trial judge and defense counsel of redaction); id. Charges ¶ (g) (alleging 
disciplinary violation based on this conduct). 
There is some dispute as to the date of the meeting covered by this document. It clearly states 
that it is an “Interview with Porter on October 5.” Id. Exhibit 4, at 1. Honeycutt contends that the notes 
in Exhibits 4 and 5 that are labeled are in fact notes that combine meetings on two different days, Octo- 
ber 3 and 4, combined with his own “to do” list. Honeycutt Answer, supra note 102, at 19-21; see also 
Motions Dismiss and Answer of Scott T. Brewer at 19-22, N.C. State Bar v. Brewer, No. 05 DHC 37 
(Disciplinary Hearing Comm’n of the N.C. State Bar Oct. 21, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Brewer Answer]. The Special Prosecutor states that his investigation determined the date of the meeting 
was October 4, 1996 and that it was typed on October 5. Special Prosecutor’s Report, supra note 113, at 
18. 
127 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, Exhibit 5, at 4. 
128 Id. Compare id. (complete version), with id. Exhibit 4, at 4 (incomplete version). The “re- 
dacted” version was found by post-conviction counsel in the sealed materials submitted to Judge Helms, 
while the “unredacted” version was found in the DA file. Affidavit of Robert H. Hale, Jr. Regarding 
Sealed File of Porter Materials ¶¶ 4, 9(b) (Sept. 29, 2003), Exhibits to Third Amended Hoffman MAR, 
supra note 8, Exhibit 4.11. 
Honeycutt responded that the entries at issue were more or less a “to do list” that was changed 
as items were completed and that the particular entry regarding a meeting with the federal prosecutor 
was accomplished by the subsequent October 17 meeting where the “substantial assistance” agreement 
was reached. Honeycutt Answer, supra note 102, at 20-22. 
129 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, Exhibit 4, at 4. 
130 Honeycutt Answer, supra note 102, ¶ 24; Brewer Answer, supra note 126, ¶ 27. 
131 Honeycutt Answer, supra note 102, ¶ 16; Brewer Answer, supra note 126, ¶ 33. 
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The two prosecutors also argued that the order to disclose inducements 
to witnesses was narrower than alleged by the Bar. Brewer notes that the 
State Bar Complaint asserts it is referring to a court order, but it is in fact 
quoting the defense motion that requested the “details of any promises or 
indications of actual or possible immunity, leniency, favorable treatment or 
other consideration whatsoever or any inducements or threats” by federal or 
state agents to prosecution witnesses.132 However, the trial judge declined to 
so order and instead restricted the mandate just to “any promise of immu- 
nity.”133 Honeycutt argued that the “State Bar rules in effect at the time did 
not place upon a prosecutor an affirmative duty to turn over impeachment 
material.”134 With respect to the order of Judge Helms, Honeycutt argued 
that no signed order was entered by the trial court and that the transcript 
revealed that “if there was an order it was so ambiguous that Honeycutt 
could not have intentionally violated [its] terms.”135 
When contrasted with the litigation for a new trial on Brady grounds, 
the State Bar Complaint shows something of the different nature of ethics 
allegations and appears to illustrate an “easy out” for trial courts examining 
the legal, as opposed to the ethical, claim. Superior Court Judge W. Erwin 
Spainhour conducted a hearing on Hoffman’s Motion for Appropriate Re- 
lief on April 26, 2004.136 In an order signed on April 30, 2004, he granted a 
new trial because Hoffman’s trial attorney was unaware of the federal im- 
munity granted to Porter, even though the judge found as fact that neither 
Honeycutt nor Brewer knew of the grant of federal immunity either.137 
Judge Spainhour’s order stated that relief was to be granted despite lack of 
 
 
132 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶ 25. 
133 Brewer Answer, supra note 126, ¶ 25. 
134 Honeycutt Answer, supra note 102, ¶ 13. 
135 Id. ¶¶ 13, 27. 
136 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Dismissal Order, supra note 2, at 13. 
137 Hoffman New Trial Order, supra note 100, Findings of Fact ¶¶ 9-11, Conclusions of Law ¶ 4. 
See also N.C. State Bar v. Brewer, 644 S.E.2d 573, 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
In making this finding, the trial court went beyond the advice given by Special Deputy Attorney 
General Jill Ledford Cheek regarding the order. In a letter submitted by fax to the judge, Cheek cited 
contested matters of fact which she believed made certain findings of fact inappropriate on a summary 
adjudication. Letter from Jill Ledford Cheek, N.C. Special Deputy Attorney Gen., to the Honorable W. 
Erwin Spainhour, N.C. Superior Court Judge (Apr. 29, 2004) (on file with author). She submitted a 
revised proposed order to the judge and explained, “Finding of Fact No. 10 in the submitted Order is 
controverted by the defense and accordingly, I have deleted that finding in my proposed Order . . . .” Id. 
Judge Spainhour nevertheless included that paragraph, which reads, “Neither District Attorney 
Honeycutt nor Assistant District Attorney Brewer sought, requested, or participated in any discussions 
regarding the federal immunity agreement.” Hoffman New Trial Order, supra note 100, Findings of Fact 
¶ 10. 
Charges against Hoffman were ultimately dismissed because the prosecutor concluded he had 
insufficient evidence. See Emily C. Achenbaum, A Murder Case Dissolves, NEWS & OBSERVER (Ra- 
leigh, N.C.), Dec. 12, 2007, at A1. 
 2008] THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF FULL OPEN-FILE DISCOVERY 283 
 
specific knowledge because knowledge was imputed as a matter of law to 
the prosecutor.138 
On the feature of the prosecutor’s knowledge, the Brady doctrine, 
which does not require that the prosecutor know of the exculpatory evi- 
dence, is broader than the ethical obligation of prosecutors. Rule 3.8(d), the 
applicable rule, requires disclosure of “all evidence information or informa- 
tion known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or 
mitigates the offense . . . .”139 It is that knowledge requirement that the Dis- 
ciplinary Hearing Committee in Hoke and Graves softened by finding a 
violation based on a non-delegable legal duty of a prosecutor to know the 
contents of his or her files and which the revised rule speaks to in requiring 
a “diligent inquiry.”140 The Honeycutt and Brewer Disciplinary Hearing 
Committee thus refused to dismiss an alternative ground for discipline that 
was based on the prosecutors’ implied knowledge that Porter had been ne- 
gotiating with federal authorities and deliberately avoiding inquiry into 
whether Porter had received concessions from the federal prosecutor.141 The 
revised version of Rule 3.8(d), effective in November 2006, writes that re- 
sult into the rule’s language itself.142 
The substance of the charges in the Bar Complaint against Honeycutt 
and Brewer was not litigated. Rather, it was dismissed because of the viola- 
 
138 Hoffman New Trial Order, supra note 100, Findings of Fact ¶¶ 9-11, Conclusions of Law ¶ 4; 
see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (establishing that prosecutors are charged 
with knowledge of others in the prosecution). 
Honeycutt and Brewer argued that the court’s finding of fact that they had no knowledge of the 
federal immunity agreement meant that the disciplinary charge had to be dismissed. Brewer & 
Honeycutt Bar Dismissal Order, supra note 2, at 13-14. The Disciplinary Hearing Committee rejected 
that argument because the Bar has concurrent jurisdiction and a superior court judge has no authority to 
preempt Bar discipline. Id. 14-16. 
139 N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2006); see also Richard A. Rosen, Disci- 
plinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 714 
(1987) (noting that the due process rules are in at least one sense broader than the ethical rules because 
they can be violated “even if the prosecutor did not know that the evidence was false or that the exculpa- 
tory evidence existed). 
140 The Brady doctrine contains a materiality requirement. Rosen, supra note 139. In United States 
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Supreme Court found that the following materiality standard applied 
regardless of whether the defense made a Brady argument and regardless of the specificity of any re- 
quest made: “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable 
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” id. 682. The Discipli- 
nary Hearing Committee’s opinion noted that the ethical requirement was on another dimension broader 
than the Brady doctrine in that the ethical rule does not include the materiality requirement of the Brady 
doctrine. Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Dismissal Order, supra note 2, at 15 & 20 n.9. (“Therefore, an imma- 
terial but intentional—nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence by a prosecutor could be found to be a 
violation of the ethical rule and still not violate Brady.”). 
141 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Dismissal Order, supra note 2, at 16-17. This is the Bar’s Second 
Claim for Relief. Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Complaint, supra note 96, ¶¶ 53-55. 
142 N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d). 
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tion of what was effectively a statute of limitations provision.143 The rele- 
vant provisions of the Bar rules had recently been amended to add a provi- 
sion establishing a statute of limitations.144 That provision was first con- 
strued in litigating this complaint. 
The revised rule sets a general limitation on the filing of grievances at 
six years from the “accrual of the offense,” and for offenses “the discovery 
of which has been prevented by the concealment of the accused lawyer,” an 
additional one-year period after discovery of the offense by the aggrieved 
party or by the North Carolina State Bar counsel, “whichever is later.”145 
The panel concluded that since the attorney for the aggrieved party, Hoff- 
man, discovered the offense no later than February 2001, the grievance was 
filed too late when the Bar opened grievance files in November (Honeycutt) 
and December (Brewer) 2003, even though the Bar had no knowledge of 
them until one of its lawyers read an article regarding the Hoffman case 
published by the News & Observer on November 2, 2003.146 This interpre- 
tation and the dismissal of the complaint were affirmed on appeal by the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals.147 
The circumstances that led to this ruling show that sometimes the stra- 
tegic interests of the criminal defendant are at odds with promptly pursuing 
an ethics complaint. Counsel for Hoffman stated in a newspaper article that 
he did not complain to the Bar prior to securing a favorable ruling on his 
client’s habeas motion out of concern that it would not be in Hoffman’s 
interest to pursue a State Bar grievance against Honeycutt while they were 
trying to win his agreement to grant the motion for a new trial.148 
 
143 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Dismissal Order, supra note 2, at 3-10. 
144 Id. at 3-4. 
145 N.C. STATE BAR R. 1B.0111(e) (2003). 
146 Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Dismissal Order, supra note 2, at 3-10. One of the key points is 
whether “whichever is later” could be interpreted as “whichever is latest” since three possible dates  
were given. The panel and the Court of Appeals ruled against the broader interpretation. N.C. State Bar 
v. Brewer, 644 S.E.2d 573, 577-78 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
147 Brewer, 644 S.E.2d at 577-78. Another argument by the Bar for extension of the period of time 
allowed for filing of the complaint was based on its contention that the violation involved felonious 
criminal conduct, for which no limitation period applied. The Disciplinary Hearing Commission panel 
rejected that argument on the extremely technical ground that the rule was not published in the North 
Carolina Reports as required for promulgation of a new Bar rule under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-21. 
Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Dismissal Order, supra note 2, at 10-13. The appellate court affirmed the 
panel’s decision. Brewer, 644 S.E.2d at 578-79. 
148 Joseph Neff, Former State Lawyers Cleared, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 7, 2006, 
at B1. The article states: 
The panel determined that to be February 2002, one year after Hoffman's lawyer filed docu- 
ments in court alleging withheld evidence. Mike Howell, one of Hoffman’s lawyers, said he 
was disappointed by the ruling. “It is one of the worst cases of prosecutorial misconduct I've 
ever heard of,” Howell said. “They lied to try to put a man to death, and then lied to cover it 
up, and they still won't admit it.” 
Howell said he and his co-counsel, Rob Hale of Raleigh, didn’t have enough evidence to file a 
grievance until late summer 2003, after they found witnesses and documents to corroborate the charges 
 2008] THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF FULL OPEN-FILE DISCOVERY 285 
 
III. DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST DISTRICT ATTORNEY MICHAEL 
NIFONG ARISING FROM PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DAVE EVANS, 
COLLIN FINNERTY, AND READE SELIGMANN IN THE DUKE LACROSSE 
CASE 
 
A. The Potentially Exculpatory Information and Nifong’s Failure of Im- 
mediate Disclosure 
 
On the late evening of March 13 and extending until sometime shortly 
after midnight on the morning of March 14, 2006, the co-captains of the 
men’s Duke Lacrosse team held a party at a house located at 610 North 
Buchanan Boulevard in Durham, North Carolina, where three players re- 
sided.149 In a momentous decision, they decided to have strippers dance at 
the party, and that afternoon called an escort service asking that two strip- 
pers be sent to the Buchanan address.150 Sometime between 11:00 and mid- 
night, the two strippers arrived.151 
The dancing did not go well from the very start.152 One of the dancers, 
Crystal Mangum, appeared to be staggering.153 At one point, the dancers  
fell to the floor.154 A player made a crude remark about the use of a broom- 
stick as a sexual object, which provoked the dancers to leave the living 
room where the performance was taking place and go to the bathroom 
where earlier they had changed clothes.155 Later, without resuming  the 
dance routine, the two left the residence and departed by car, exchanging 
insults with some of the players.156 
 
 
 
of prosecutorial misconduct. Howell said they held off complaining until May 2004, after Honeycutt 
agreed that Hoffman deserved a new trial. Filing a grievance earlier would have put Honeycutt on the 
defensive, and the prosecutor would never have agreed to a new trial, Howell said. “A grievance was not 
in Mr. Hoffman’s interest before then,” Howell said. “Still, I’m glad Jonathan Hoffman is alive. He 
might be dead if we didn’t find the evidence.” Id.; see also Brewer & Honeycutt Bar Dismissal Order, 
supra note 2, at 19 n.4. Defense counsel concern that instituting disciplinary proceedings may harm the 
client’s interest has been offered as a general reason why professional discipline against prosecutors is 
apparently relatively infrequent. See infra notes 311-13 and accompanying text. 
149 Summary of Conclusions from the Office of the N.C. Attorney Gen. at 5, State v. Seligmann, 
Nos. 06 CRS 4332-36, 5582-83 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Attor- 
ney General’s Report]; Joseph Neff & Anne Blythe, Team Party Turned Sour Early, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 28, 2007, at A18. 
150 Attorney General’s Report, supra note 149. 
151 
Id. 
152 See id. 
153 
Id. 
154 
Id. 
155 Id. at 5-6. 
156 Attorney General’s Report, supra note 149, at 6-8. 
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Sometime later, police were called to an all-night grocery store park- 
ing lot and examined Mangum, who appeared to be unconscious.157 She was 
taken to a local agency that offers services that include help to intoxicated 
individuals.158 There, in response to a question about whether she  was 
raped, Mangum said for the first time that she had been.159 She was taken to 
the Duke University Medical Center Emergency Room and was later exam- 
ined by a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE).160 She gave her story of 
being raped and sexually assaulted in the bathroom of the players’ resi- 
dence by three men.161 During the first 36 hours, she gave a number of 
somewhat different versions,162 but the one that seemed to be the central  
one was that she was sexually assaulted by “Adam,” “Matt,” and “Bret.”163 
She described penetration of her vagina, anus, and mouth, observed ejacula- 
tion as to some activity, and stated that no condoms were used.164 
Although the initial officer, Sergeant John C. Shelton, was skeptical of 
the rape accusation,165 the SANE nurse, Tracy Levicy, had observed tender- 
ness during the examination and expressions of pain during the vaginal 
examination, had found Mangum’s behavior and the examination “consis- 
tent with sexual assault,” and said as much to both Investigator Benjamin 
Himan on March 16 and Sergeant Mark Gottlieb on March 21, 2006.166 
Also, while not made by the SANE nurse and therefore not a “forensic find- 
ing,” Dr. Manly, who had performed an examination of Mangum before 
Levicy spoke to her at the local agency, had observed “diffuse edema of the 
vaginal walls,”167 which was consistent with sexual trauma, although not at 
all unique to it. 
On March 23, 2006, the police sought what in North Carolina is called 
a Nontestimonial Identification Order168 to secure from all the 46 Caucasian 
members of the Duke Lacrosse team: (1) “mug shot” photos; (2) photos of 
 
157 Id. at 8. 
158 
Id. 
159 
Id. 
160 Id. at 18. 
161 
Id. 
162 See Motion to Suppress the Alleged “Identification” of the Defendants by the Accuser ¶ 7, State 
v. Seligmann, Nos. 06 CRS 4331-36, 5581-83 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2006) (on file with author) 
(describing the multiple and varying descriptions given by Mangum during the first 36 hours after the 
alleged rape). 
163 Attorney General’s Report, supra note 149, at 6-8. 
164 
Id. 
165 See Joseph Neff, Lacrosse Probe Has Much Fodder, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July. 
1, 2007, at A3 (describing Shelton’s skepticism of Mangum’s account, which included him announcing 
loudly at the Duke Hospital Emergency Room, “I think she’s lying”). 
166 Tara Levicy Statement (Jan. 10, 2007), Exhibit 15, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with au- 
thor). 
167 
Id. 
168 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-271 to -282 (2006) (setting out limits on such orders and proce- 
dures, including disclosure provisions, regarding them). 
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“torso and upper extremities” to show any injuries; and (3) DNA obtained 
from mouth swabbings.169 Mangum had described the three attackers as 
white, and as a result, the one black member of the team was not named in 
the order. Nifong first learned of the rape allegation when he saw a copy of 
this order at the office copier.170 He decided to take over the investigation of 
the case, which he did the next day.171 
The “rape kit” from Mangum’s examination collected on March 14, 
2006, items of evidence seized in the search of 610 North Buchanan Street 
on March 16, 2006, and the DNA swabbings from the 46 players were ini- 
tially sent to the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) Laboratory.172 On 
March 30, 2006, Nifong learned that no blood, semen, or saliva was found 
on any of the “rape kit” items.173 He also learned that a mixture of DNA  
was found on one of Mangum’s false fingernails, which was recovered 
from the trash can in the bathroom where the rape allegedly occurred.174 
On April 4, 2006, Investigator Michelle Soucie contacted Dr. Brian 
Meehan, president and director of DNA Security, Inc. (DSI) in Burlington, 
North Carolina and learned that his lab could perform more sophisticated or 
sensitive DNA testing than the SBI lab.175 This includes “Y chromosome 
DNA testing.”176 “Y chromosome DNA testing” can frequently effectively 
separate male from female DNA. On April 5, 2006, Nifong obtained an 
 
169 Application for Nontestimonial Identification Order, In the Matter of: 610 N. Buchanan Blvd. 
Durham, NC 27701, Exhibit 203, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). 
170 Joseph Neff, Quest to Convict Hid a Lack of Evidence, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), 
Apr. 14, 2007, at A1 (describing Nifong learning of case on March 23, 2006 when he found a copy of 
the DNA order (Nontestimonial Identification Order) on the office copy machine and the next day 
telling the Durham police he was taking over the investigation). 
171 See Amended Complaint ¶ 190, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Amended Nifong Bar Complaint]; see also Supplemental Case notes for: Sgt. M.D. Gottlieb at 6, Ex- 
hibit 204, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) (describing Captain Lamb’s instructions on 
March 24, 2006 to “continue with our investigation, but to go through Mr. Nifong for any directions as 
to how to conduct matters in this case”). 
172 See Attachment for Application for Search Warrant at 1, In Matter of: 610 N. Buchanan Blvd., 
Durham, NC 27701 (N.C. Dist. Ct. Mar. 16, 2006), Exhibit 7, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with 
author). The SBI DNA report indicates items, such as a white bath towel from and five false fingernails 
from the trash can in “bathroom B” that was obtained through this search. North Carolina State Bureau 
of Investigation Department of Justice Raleigh Laboratory Report at 2-3 (Apr. 10, 2006), Exhibit 209, 
Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinafter SBI DNA Report]. 
173 Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 3, ¶ 36. See also Deposition of Michael B. Nifong at 
188-90 (May 17, 2006), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author); Excerpt Transcript of Testimony 
of Jennifer Leyn at 9-13 (June 13, 2007), Nifong, 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) (describing March 30, 
2006 telephone conversation with Nifong); Telephone Log of Conference Call on March 30, 2006 
between SBI Technicians and Nifong, Exhibit 9, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinaf- 
ter Telephone Log]. 
174 Telephone Log, supra note 173. 
175 Pretrial Order, Exhibit A, Stipulated Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 96-97 (June 12, 2006), Exhibit 1, 
Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinafter Nifong Bar Stipulations]. 
176 
Id. 
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order transferring the evidence from the SBI lab to DSI, stating in support 
of that order that the purpose was to search for useful information on Man- 
gum’s “rape kit” items.177 The test later became useful with respect to the 
false fingernail found in the trash can of the bathroom where the rape alleg- 
edly occurred. 
On April 10, April 21, and May 12, 2006, Nifong, along with Durham 
Police Investigator Himan and Sergeant Gottlieb, traveled to Burlington and 
met with Dr. Meehan.178 Before April 10, DSI had determined that DNA 
from up to four different males had been found on items from the “rape kit” 
and that all the Duke Lacrosse samples had been excluded as possible 
sources of that foreign male DNA.179 By April 20, 2006 further testing re- 
vealed DNA characteristics from additional males on another item from the 
“rape kit” and that the Duke players had all been excluded as possible 
sources of that DNA.180 
This information is obviously potentially exculpatory in two ways. 
First, no matches from the DNA of any of the 46 players were found. That 
suggests, but does not establish, that no rape occurred. It is relatively strong 
evidence of innocence given Magnum’s statements that no condoms were 
used. Second, foreign DNA was found, which is exculpatory as well. That 
evidence would have been strongest in its exculpatory impact for three 
charged players if the DNA had definitely incriminated three different Duke 
Lacrosse players in the rape.181 Mangum stated that three and only three, 
 
177 Petition, In Re: Criminal Investigation, 610 North Buchanan Blvd., Durham, North Carolina 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 2006), Exhibit 207, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 36 (on file with author); Order, In Re: 
Criminal Investigation, 610 North Buchanan Blvd., Durham, North Carolina (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 
2006), Exhibit 207, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 36 (on file with author). The “rape kit” contains swabs and 
smears taken from the mouth, vagina, and anus, public hair combings, and panties. SBI DNA Report, 
supra note 172, at 1. 
178 Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 171 ¶¶ 202, 210, 216. 
179    Id. ¶¶ 200-01. 
180    Id. ¶¶ 208-09. 
181 Some of the exculpatory DNA results were known by DSI and presented to Nifong before 
evidence was first presented to the grand jury on April 17, 2006 and indictments returned against the 
first two charged players, Reade Seligmann and Collin Finnerty. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke 
Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice,” 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1372 (2007). Before May 15, 2006, when evidence was presented to the grand 
jury and an indictment was returned against Dave Evans, the third player, further exculpatory results had 
been obtained and presented to Nifong. Id. at 1373. Before indictments were returned against the spe- 
cific players, DNA evidence definitely linking any specific three Duke lacrosse player to the rape would 
have been exculpatory as to all the other team members. The failure of the prosecution to demand an 
adequate basis of evidence to prosecute that led to the charges against the three players effectively put 
virtually every member of the team at some risk of indictment upon the misfortune of being selected by 
Mangum from one of the arrays presented to her that included only Duke lacrosse players. See generally 
id. at 1365-1412 (describing the identification process and arguing that the most fundamental ethical 
transgression in the case was the prosecutor’s failure to meet the basic duty to “do justice” as particu- 
larly manifest in the failings of the identification procedures). 
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men assaulted her at the lacrosse party, and none of the players had an in- 
nocent explanation for how his DNA could have gotten onto “rape kit” 
items given the intimate nature of the contact required. However, the re- 
sults, even if not showing sexual activity with other Duke lacrosse players, 
were still exculpatory in that they suggested sexual contact with multiple 
males, and they would help explain the only physical finding that supported 
the rape allegation—the vaginal swelling that could have been produced by 
sexual contact. 
Meehan kept no notes of the meetings with Nifong. However, in his 
testimony before the Disciplinary Hearing Committee, he stated that at each 
of the meetings he described the test results obtained, and thus Nifong 
would have known on April 10, 2006 about the foreign male DNA that 
could not have belonged to any Duke Lacrosse player, and on April 21, 
2006 about additional foreign male DNA that could not have belonged to 
any Duke Lacrosse player. He described Nifong’s request for a written re- 
port of the positive matches, which did not include a report of the poten- 
tially exculpatory information of the male DNA that was not from a Duke 
Lacrosse player. In his Disciplinary Hearing Committee testimony, Meehan 
stated that he had not been told to exclude anything but rather only to in- 
clude the positive matches, which effectively excluded the exculpatory in- 
formation.182 
 
 
182 Excerpt Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Brian Meehan at 67 (June 13, 2007), Nifong, No. 06 
DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinafter Meehan Testimony] (stating that Nifong was requesting “a 
report that illustrated the match that we had identified, as well as any other matches”); id. at 90 (stating 
that “he conveyed to us . . . that . . . he had a proceeding coming up which he would need a report that 
specifically addressed the matches that were identified to date”). 
In testimony Meehan gave at the December 15, 2006 hearing on the defendants’ motion regard- 
ing this exculpatory information, the following exchange occurred between him and Jim Cooney, lead 
counsel for Seligmann, who asked the following questions: 
Q. Did your report set forth the results of all of the tests and examinations that you conducted 
in this case? 
A. No. It was limited to only some results. 
Q. Okay. And that was an intentional limitation arrived at between you and representatives of 
the State of North Carolina not to report on the results of all examinations and tests that you 
did in his case? 
A. Yes. 
Transcript of December 15, 2006 Hearing at 85, State v. Finnerty, Nos. 06 CRS 4331-36, 5582-83 (N.C. 
Super Ct. Dec. 15, 2006), Exhibit 230, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinafter Tran- 
script of December 15, 2006 Hearing]; see also Joseph Neff et al., Lab Chief: Nifong Said Don’t Report 
All DNA Data, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 16, 2006, at A1. Meehan contradicted that 
statement in his testimony before the Disciplinary Hearing Committee. Meehan Testimony, supra, at 
178 (“I tried to make that clear in my testimony on December 15th, and it wasn’t heard . . . . Mr. Nifong 
never, never specifically requested that I include specific information or exclude specific information on 
this report, which was a [sic] interim report.”). The panel did not find that Nifong requested Meehan to 
refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party under Rule 3.4(f), Excerpt Tran- 
script Findings of Fact, supra note 4, at 10, likely because of that change in testimony and because of 
similar statements made in other parts of the December 15, 2006 hearing. 
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Regardless of the explanation, the DSI Report dated May 12, 2006 
presents only the results of three positive matches, which occupy most of 
the final six of the ten pages in the report. These are: DNA characteristics 
partially consistent with the DNA of David Evans found on a false finger- 
nail from the bathroom where the rape allegedly occurred; DNA character- 
istics that more fully matched another Duke Lacrosse player but were still 
incomplete found on a false fingernail recovered from another part of the 
house; and “a sperm fraction from the vaginal swab that was consistent with 
the DNA profile of the alleged victim’s boyfriend.”183 
Nifong had an ethical duty under Rule 3.8(d) to provide the exculpa- 
tory information in a timely fashion, which is not explained further by the 
rule, but lacks any suggestion that prolonged unjustified delay is author- 
ized.184 A generous interpretation of his constitutional duty should have 
produced prompt disclosure, but due process is violated only if the informa- 
 
 
 
183 Nifong Bar Stipulations, supra note 175, ¶ 110; see also Report of DNA Security, Inc. at 6-10 
(May 12, 2006), Exhibit 214, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinafter DSI Report]. 
184 The disciplinary rule’s requirement of “timely” disclosure could be interpreted to mean the 
same as Brady, see supra note 10 and accompanying text, although the wording is not directly linked to 
the trial and therefore would seem to require greater promptness. The immediacy of duty could be stated 
more clearly as was done in the ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice, which define as unethical an 
intentional failure to disclose “at the earliest feasible opportunity.” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, Standard 3-3.11(a) (3d ed. 1993); see also Rosen, supra note 139, at 711-12. Despite the fail- 
ure to be more specific, the timeliness requirement makes no reference to use at trial. The Disciplinary 
Hearing Committee in the Duke Lacrosse case rejected a related argument that the disciplinary rule 
depended on a due process violation, which in turn required that the evidence not be available for trial. 
See Motion to Dismiss and Answer ¶¶ 1-2, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) (making this 
argument); Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 8-9, Nifong, No. 
06 DHC 35 (on file with author) (arguing against it). 
Assistant District Attorney Marsha Goodenow testified that the proper practice was to turn over 
exculpatory information immediately. See Anne Blythe et al., Prosecutor: Nifong Did It All Wrong, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 15, 2007, at A1; see also Excerpt Transcript of Testimony of 
Michael B. Nifong at 255 (Jun. 15, 2007), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Nifong Testimony] (showing discussion between cross-examiner recounting Goodenow’s testimony and 
Nifong, who disagreed that there was an obligation of immediate disclosure). Immediate disclosure 
indeed sounds like proper practice, but the interpretation of the timing requirement of the disciplinary 
rule is, perhaps, a more substantial issue than it was considered by the Nifong panel in the absence of 
more concrete direction than the word “timely” in the rule. 
Certainly the ethical rule can be broader than the constitutional requirement, but the ethical rule 
appears to have grown from the constitutional doctrine. The provision “make timely disclosure” is taken 
directly from the ABA’s Model Rule. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2002). If the 
ethical requirement is to differ from the constitutional doctrine from which it is derived or if a definite 
meaning is to be given to the apparently indefinite phrase “make timely disclosure,” I suggest these 
actions should come through actions of the rule drafting authority in the form of a change in the rule 
rather than by an interpretation of an individual disciplinary hearing panel. Cf. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.8(e) (2007) (stating that a prosecutor shall not “[i]ntentionally fail to disclose to the 
defense, upon request and at a time when use by the defense is reasonably feasible”). 
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tion is not provided in time for effective use at trial.185 Assuming he had not 
violated the constitutional requirement, Nifong had surely failed the related 
ethical duty. In past years, discovery of such a failure and professional dis- 
cipline would have been largely left to chance. In the next Section, I de- 
scribe the end of that journey in December 2006 and work through the path 
to disclosure, which, because of the breadth of North Carolina’s open-file 
discovery law and the quality of counsel in this case, was not the matter of 
chance it would have been earlier. 
Meehan testified that the other, non-positive, results were referenced 
in the highlighted portion of the following paragraph of his report, which 
appeared at the top of page five under the heading “Results of DNA analy- 
sis”: 
 
Individual DNA profiles for non-probative evidence specimens and suspect reference speci- 
mens are being retained at DSI pending notification of the client. Three of the reference 
specimens are consistent with DNA profiles obtained from some evidence items and the 
analysis of these specimens is below.186 
 
In January 2007, Meehan provided a modified report in which that  
first sentence was expanded to two and modified. The first sentence, which 
supposedly covered the same results as in the above italicized words, is 
shown below: 
 
 
185 When Brady material must be disclosed is a function of the doctrine’s materiality requirement. 
The materiality requirement looks not to disclosure but to the retrospective impact on the outcome at a 
past trial, which is particularly unfortunate when Brady is considered as a discovery tool. See John G. 
Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 
443 (2001) (describing the general conclusion of scholars regarding the unfortunate aspects of Brady 
retrospective “bad timing” on the doctrine as an effective disclosure device before trial). It also means 
that the disciplinary rule is more demanding in terms of timing, which for Brady is violated only if the 
information is provided too late for effective trial use. See Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor’s Ethical 
Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1379, 1421 n.221 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court has regarded Brady as a “trial right” that is 
“satisfied so long as disclosure is made in time for effective use at that stage”); Robert G. Movillo et al., 
Motion Denied: Systematic Impediments to White Collar Criminal Defendants’ Trial Preparation, 42 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 168-69 (2005) (describing “in sufficient time to allow the defendant to use the 
evidence effectively” as the timing requirement of Brady). 
In general, the constitutional rule is both broader and narrower than the ethical rule. The ethical 
rule is broader in not requiring materiality. Rosen, supra note 139, at 714; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1995) (noting that the obligations under Rule 3.8(d) of the ABA’s Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct and Standard 3.3-11(a) of the ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice are broader 
than the constitutional disclosure obligation under Brady and Bagley, which are “not violated every time 
the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the defense”). The 
disciplinary rule is narrower in that it requires a knowing violation by the prosecutor whereas the consti- 
tutional rule is violated by failing to disclose information held by other investigative agents even though 
entirely unknown to the prosecutor. Rosen, supra note 139, at 714. 
186 DSI Report, supra note 183, at 5 (emphasis added). 
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Individual DNA profiles for evidence specimens (item numbers 15772, 15776, 15785, 
15816-15818) consistent with male profiles that did not match DNA profiles from any refer- 
ence specimens and DNA profiles for reference specimens . . . were being retained at DSI 
pending notification from the client 
187
 
 
The difference in the italicized language is striking. Elsewhere in the 
report these specimen numbers are identified as obtained from the panties, 
the rectal swabs, and the combing of the pubic area.188 The language of the 
first report suggests inconsequential results; the revised report’s language 
speaks of significant and exculpatory conclusions. 
 
B. The Road to Disclosure and the Critical Role of the Full Open-File 
Discovery Law 
 
In the Bar’s Complaint and the findings of the Disciplinary Hearing 
Committee that heard the case, five legal bases for disclosure are cited: (1) 
the relatively new North Carolina full open-file discovery statute, which 
requires memoranda to be prepared of witness interviews and the prepara- 
tion and disclosure of expert witness reports;189 (2) the requirements of the 
Nontestimonial Identification statute, which requires the disclosure to sub- 
jects of the order of all results;190 (3) the June 22, 2006 discovery order; (4) 
the requirement under the United States Constitution to disclose exculpa- 
tory evidence; and (5) Ethical Rule 3.8(d), which requires immediate dis- 
closure of evidence potentially favorable to the defendant.191 The Bar also 
charged Nifong with making intentionally false statements of material fact 
to the trial court, to opposing counsel, and to the Bar, and alleged that this 
conduct involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.192 The 
Disciplinary Hearing Committee found violations of most of the charges 
involved, covering nine disciplinary rules.193 
Defense counsel cited these five bases for discovery in their efforts to 
secure disclosure and all played some role in the unfolding process. Al- 
though the disclosure obligation that is part of the statutory requirement of 
the Nontestimonial Identification procedure began the process, an examina- 
tion of the process that led to the ultimate disclosure of the exculpatory 
187 Amended Report of DNA Security, Inc. at 5 (Jan. 12, 2007), Exhibit 240, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 
35 (on file with author) (entire sentence emphasized in original). 
188 Id. at 2-3. Item 15772 is identified as obtained from the panties, Item 15776 is identified as a 
“sperm fraction” and Item 15785 as an “[e]pithelial fraction” of the rectal swabs, and Items 15816-18 
are from the combing of the pubic area. Id. 
189 Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 171, ¶ 227 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A- 
903(a)(1)-(2)). 
190 Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-282). 
191 Id. Charges ¶ d(i)-(ii). 
192 Id. Charges ¶¶ (e)-(g). 
193 Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 3, at 20-22. 
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information and the imposition of serious professional disciplinary sanc- 
tions against Nifong shows that the lion’s share of the work was done by 
the discovery statute. Its routine application produced the basis for further 
requests, and its standard requirement of full disclosure established an ex- 
pectation of compliance that the trial judge treated as routine. The persistent 
work of excellent counsel moved the process of further disclosure forward 
step by step and established, in the process, a record of Nifong’s deceptive 
statements in court that was at the center of his undoing. 
 
1. Initial Discovery Requests 
 
On April 6, 2006, before any charges were filed, an attorney represent- 
ing 33 of the players wrote Nifong and demanded information about any 
identifications secured using the photos taken and the results of any analy- 
sis conducted regarding the DNA from the swabbings.194 Such disclosure is 
required by the North Carolina statute that authorizes the court to enter an 
order such as the one requiring the Duke Lacrosse players to have their 
pictures and DNA samples taken.195 On April 12, 2006, Nifong wrote to a 
list of eleven attorneys responding to this and likely other requests. He ac- 
knowledged that he was aware of his duties under the referenced statute to 
provide a report of the identification procedure. He indicated he would pro- 
vide the written report immediately upon receipt of it, as he had done with 
respect to the SBI DNA report when he received it on April 10, 2006.196 
Apparently, this Nontestimonial Identification statute is the reason Nifong 
requested a written report from Meehan, who understood it was needed for 
some court proceeding.197 
Two days after being indicted, on April 19, 2006, Seligmann’s counsel 
filed a discovery motion requesting compliance with the discovery statute 
and requesting specifically all DNA analysis and any exculpatory informa- 
tion.198 On April 26, 2006, Finnerty’s counsel filed a request for voluntary 
discovery, which also requested exculpatory evidence and asked that the 
prosecution give notice as to any expert expected to be called at trial and 
 
 
 
194 Letter from Robert C. Ekstrand, Attorney, to Michael B. Nifong, Durham County Dist. Attor- 
ney at 1-3 (Apr. 6, 2006), Exhibit 206, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). 
195 These are called Nontestimonial Identification Orders. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-271 to - 
282 (2007). The disclosure provision is found in section 282. 
196 Letter from Michel B. Nifong, Durham County District Attorney, to Glen Bachman et al. at 1 
(April 12, 2006), Exhibit 211, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). 
197 See Meehan Testimony supra note 182, at 67, 90 (indicating report was needed for some uni- 
dentified upcoming hearing). 
198 Request for, or Alternative Motion for, Discovery at 1-5, State v. Seligmann, Nos. 06 CRS 
4334-36 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 19, 2006), Exhibit 212, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). 
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furnish reports of those experts.199 Then on May 17, 2006, Finnerty’s coun- 
sel filed the first of a series of motions to compel discovery. The first mo- 
tion requested exculpatory information as well, but more specifically de- 
manded that any expert witness “prepare, and furnish to the defendant, a 
report of the results of any (not only the ones about which the expert ex- 
pects to testify) examinations or tests conducted by the expert.”200 
 
2. May 18, 2006 Written Response and Court Proceedings 
 
On May 18, 2006, in a written pleading responding to the request for 
voluntary discovery that accompanied the delivery of 1,278 pages of dis- 
covery, Nifong stated: “The State is not aware of any additional material or 
information which may be exculpatory in nature with respect to the Defen- 
dant.”201 He also gave notice of nine potential experts, which included 
Meehan, his language tracking the elements of the discovery provisions 
regarding experts.202 And orally at the hearing conducted that day, when 
asked by the court about whether he had provided all the discovery materi- 
als to the defendants, Nifong responded: “I’ve turned over everything I 
have.”203 Plainly, his two statements that he had turned over all exculpatory 
evidence and all evidence that he had were untrue, as the Disciplinary Hear- 
ing Committee found.204 
 
199 Request for Voluntary Discovery, State v. Finnerty, Nos. 06 CRS 4331-33 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Apr. 26, 2006), Exhibit 215(a), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). 
200 Defendant’s First Motion to Compel Discovery at 3, Finnerty, Nos. 06 CRS 4331-33, Exhibit 
215(b), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). 
Finnerty’s second through fifth motions to compel discovery were filed between May 25 and 
June 9, 2006 and dealt with different specific types of evidence. See Exhibits 215(c)-(f), Nifong, No. 06 
DHC 35 (on file with author). For example, the second motion focused on the accusing witness’ state- 
ments. Defendant’s Second Motion to Compel Discovery at 1, 3, Finnerty, Nos. 06 CRS 4331-33, 
Exhibit 215(c), Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). 
201 Response to Defendant’s Request for Voluntary Discovery, Statutory Notices, and Reciprocal 
Motions ¶ 3, State v. Evans, Nos. 06 CRS 5581-83 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 18, 2006), Exhibit 216(a), 
Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinafter Discovery Response]. Nifong provided identi- 
cal responses to Finnerty and Seligman in separate pleadings. See Exhibits 216(b)-(c), Nifong, No. 06 
DHC 35 (on file with author). 
202 Discovery Response, supra note 201, ¶ 5. The notice also listed R.W. Scales, another employee 
of DSI. Id. 
203 Transcript of May 18, 2006 Hearing at 22-23, State v. Evans, Nos. 06 CRS 5583, 4331-36 
(N.C. Super. Ct. May 18, 2007), Exhibit 217, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). In the prose- 
cution of Jonathan Hoffman, the Assistant District Attorney made almost precisely the same statement: 
“I have given them everything that I have.” Trial Transcript of October 30, 2006 at 1589, Exhibits to 
Third Amended Hoffman MAR, supra note 8, Exhibit 4.10(c). 
204 Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 3, ¶ 72 (finding written discovery responses to have 
been “intentional misrepresentations and intentional false statements of material fact to opposing coun- 
sel and to the Court”); id. ¶ 74 (finding Nifong’s response to the trial judge to have been “a misrepresen- 
tation and a false statement of material fact”). 
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3. June 22, 2006 Discovery Order and Court Proceeding 
 
On June 19, 2006, Joe Cheshire, lead counsel for Evans, based in part 
on the discovery provided to that point, requested by letter a report of what 
transpired at the meeting on April 10, 2006 involving Nifong, Investigator 
Himan, Sergeant Gottlieb, and Meehan.205 The discovery statute requires 
that memoranda be prepared of witness conversations,206 and Cheshire was 
asking that it be produced. At the next court hearing on June 22, 2006, this 
request was covered and Nifong represented and reiterated that nothing 
beyond the information in the report was discussed other than conversations 
regarding how the report would be used in court, which he asserted was 
“not discoverable.”207 In response to the counsel’s request and the trial 
court’s inquiry, Nifong represented that nothing beyond the information in 
the report was discussed with Meehan, which was false.208 Cheshire pressed 
the issue, indicating some skepticism that nothing beyond the narrow defi- 
nition of work product described by Nifong had been covered, and asked 
the trial court to require the preparation of written reports of the conversa- 
tion to be submitted to the court for in camera review.209 The judge denied 
the request.210 
Also, at the hearing, a proposed discovery order was discussed, which 
Nifong understood “in essence . . . requests that the Court enter an order 
that tells the State to comply with the discovery statute,” which Nifong did 
not object to being entered.211 The court correctly noted that the order 
tracked the statute.212 The judge signed the order.213 The statute and the or- 
der required Nifong, inter alia, to provide “results of tests and examina- 
tions, or any other matter or evidence obtained during the investigation of 
the offenses alleged to have been committed by the defendant”214 and, as to 
witnesses the State expects to call, to provide “results of any examinations 
or tests conducted by the expert.”215 
 
205 Letter from Joseph B. Cheshire, V, Attorney, to Michael B. Nifong, Durham County Dist. 
Attorney ¶ 8 (June 19, 2006), Exhibit 220, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). 
206 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2007) (covering oral statements). 
207 Transcript of June 22, 2006 Hearing at 16, Evans, Nos. 06 CRS 5581-83, 4331-33, Exhibit 222, 
Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinafter Transcript of June 22, 2006 Hearing]. 
208 Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 171, ¶¶ 240-41; see also Amended Nifong Bar 
Order, supra note 3, ¶ 80 (finding representation to the trial court to have been “intentional misrepresen- 
tations and intentional false statements of material fact to the Court and to opposing counsel”). 
209 Transcript of June 22, 2006 Hearing, supra note 207, at 21-23. 
210 Id. at 23. 
211 Id. at 3. 
212 
Id. 
213 Order ¶ 2, State v. Finnerty, Nos. 06 CRS 4331-33 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 22, 2006), Exhibit 
221, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). 
214    Id. ¶ 1. 
215    Id. ¶ 2. 
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4. September 22, 2006 Court Proceeding 
 
On August 31, 2006, counsel for the three defendants jointly filed a 
discovery motion.216 The discovery materials obtained to that point 
prompted more specific follow-up requests in a number of areas, and one of 
those concerned the interactions with Meehan. The motion, inter alia, set 
out the chronology of the three meetings with Meehan,217 and it asked for 
two types of disclosures regarding DSI testing. First, it renewed Cheshire’s 
request that the oral statements, now understood to be made at three meet- 
ings, be put into written form, and coupled it with a Brady request.218 Sec- 
ond, the motion asked for “the complete file and all underlying data regard- 
ing DSI’s work.”219 
The hearing on that motion was held on September 22, 2006 before a 
different judge, W. Osmond Smith III, who had been specially assigned to 
handle the case. Brad Bannon, another of Evans’ attorneys, addressed the 
meetings with Meehan revealed by discovery already produced and re- 
newed the prior request for disclosure of the substance of the conversations 
at those meeting.220 At the hearing, Nifong represented that the DSI report 
encompassed all tests performed and everything discussed at his meetings 
with Meehan. He had an exchange with the trial judge, which began by the 
judge asking, “So his report encompasses it all?”221 Nifong began to an- 
swer, “His report encompasses ever— . . . ”222 but he was apparently inter- 
rupted. The judge asked the question somewhat differently the second time: 
“So you represent there are no other statements from Dr. Meehan?”223 Ni- 
fong replied: “No other statements. No other statements made to me.”224 
Bannon inquired: “Just so I’m clear, Mr. Nifong is representing that the 
facts of the case weren’t discussed in those meetings.”225 And once again, 
Nifong falsely replied: “That is correct . . . .”226 Based on Nifong’s re- 
 
216 Joint Omnibus Motion to Compel Discovery ¶ 40, State v. Evans, Nos. 06 CRS 5581-83, 4331- 
36 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2006), Exhibit 223, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) [hereinaf- 
ter Joint Motion to Compel]. 
217 Id. ¶¶ 7-8. 
218 Id. ¶¶ 28-29. 
219 Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 171, ¶ 244. A similar request regarding underlying 
data was made about the SBI testing. Joint Motion to Compel, supra note 216, ¶ 35. 
220 Transcript of September 22, 2006 Hearing supra note 207, at 24-27, State v. Finnerty, Nos. 06 
CRS 4331-36, 5582-83 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2006), Exhibit 225, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Transcript of September 22, 2006 Hearing]. 
221 Id. at 27. 
222 
Id. 
223 Id. at 28. 
224 
Id. 
225 
Id. 
226 Transcript of September 22, 2006 Hearing, supra note 220, at 27-28. The Disciplinary Hearing 
Committee found that Nifong’s responses to the judge’s questions at the September 22 hearing were 
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sponse, the trial court required no further disclosure of the substance of 
those conversations.227 
Later in the hearing, the request for the underlying data from DSI was 
discussed. Nifong read a letter from Meehan raising cost and privacy con- 
cerns regarding non-defendants who might be connected with Mangum by 
DNA evidence.228 The court granted the discovery request with a protective 
order directing protection of privacy rights and with reasonable costs paid 
by the State.229 
Finally on the DNA matter, Douglas Kingsbury, one of the attorneys 
representing Finnerty, returned to the discovery request regarding the un- 
derlying data to the SBI and DSI testing of DNA. Without knowing the 
exculpatory results that had not been disclosed, he could hardly have been 
more on point: 
 
I just want to make sure that the discovery that we’re requesting is not being misconstrued 
and therefore limited in the state’s response . . . . There may be additional male DNA that 
was recovered and analyzed and found by these experts but they couldn’t match it with any- 
one because the state hasn’t given the identities to the DNA experts. And this is my point: 
We’re seeking information of any additional DNA that was found on this alleged victim even 
though it doesn’t match any of these defendants.230 
 
The court demurred, stating that the discovery request was broadly 
stated, with the implication being that the specific request was included,  
and announced a break.231 Nifong, who had been put squarely on notice that 
the results of foreign male DNA were being requested and that Kingsbury 
was apparently not aware of them, made no comment before or after that 
break.232 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“intentional misrepresentations and intentional false statements of material fact to the Court and to 
opposing counsel.” Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 3, ¶ 88. Similarly, in a subsequent separate 
criminal contempt proceeding, the trial court concluded that in answering the judge’s questions, “Nifong 
willfully and intentionally made false statements of material fact.” Order and Judgment of Contempt and 
Sentence at 4, In re Nifong, No. 07 CRS 10467 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2007) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Nifong Criminal Contempt Order]. 
227 Transcript of September 22, 2006 Hearing, supra note 220, at 28. 
228 Id. at 49-51. 
229 Id. at 53. 
230 Id. at 73-74. 
231 Id. at 74. 
232 See id. at 74-75. 
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5. October 27, 2006 Delivery of DSI Data, Attorney Bannon’s Dis- 
covery of Exculpatory Results, and Precisely Pointed Disclosure 
Demand 
 
At the next court hearing on October 27, 2006, Nifong provided 1,844 
pages of underlying data and materials related to DSI’s tests and examina- 
tions, but critically, he did not add any explanatory material or otherwise 
point out the exculpatory results that the underlying data showed, if exam- 
ined carefully and understood.233 The raw and unexplained data was thus 
provided only a little more than a week before election day in the hotly con- 
tested Durham District Attorney’s race in which Nifong was a candidate, 
and substantial evaluation would be required to understand its significance, 
no doubt too late to have any impact on the election.234 
There may be no connection between the delayed DNA disclosure and 
the election. However, the Disciplinary Hearing Committee found that it 
was the primary election in the contest for district attorney that motivated 
Nifong’s violation of pretrial publicity constraints.235 My suggestion is that 
the same motivation, extended to the general election, may have prompted 
Nifong’s failure to disclose or his delay in disclosing the DNA results. The 
motivation should have become weaker after the primary, but it continued 
and provides a plausible explanation for this conduct. 
In his testimony before the Disciplinary Hearing Committee, attorney 
Brad Bannon described the 60 to 100 hours he spent learning the basics of 
DNA analysis in an effort to understand the significance of the results for 
his client, Dave Evans, whose DNA was consistent with, but only inconclu- 
sively matched, an incomplete DNA profile recovered from the accuser’s 
233 Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 171, ¶¶ 254-55. 
234 Nifong won the Democratic primary in May 2006. Anne Blythe & Benjamin Niolet, DA Peti- 
tion Drives Crawl in Durham Challenges, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 21, 2006, at A1.  
By mid-June, Nifong, who had no formal opposition, had acquired two opponents who started petition 
campaigns to be placed on the November ballot. Id. One of those, Durham County Commissioner Lewis 
Cheek, a Democrat, acquired enough signatures to be placed on the ballot. Benjamin Niolet, Cheek 
Passes on Run for DA: Even if Elected, Says He Won’t Serve, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 
28, 2006, at B1. Cheek ultimately decided he would not serve, but his name remained on the ballot and 
in announcing that he would ask the governor to appoint someone else if he were elected, Cheek served 
as something of a surrogate opponent along with others who organized write-in campaigns. Id. Despite 
having no formal active opponent, the campaign continued with a somewhat spirited tone. See Benjamin 
Niolet, Voting Takes a Spirited Tone: Volunteer Put on a Party in Durham, NEWS & OBSERVER (Ra- 
leigh, N.C.), Nov. 5, 2006, at B1. Nifong won the general election on November 7, 2006 with a 10% 
margin over Cheek, although he garnered less than half the votes cast. Benjamin Niolet et al., Nifong 
Fends Off Two Challengers, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 8, 2006, at A1. He received 49% 
of the vote, to 39% for Cheek, and 12% for various write-in candidates. Id. 
235 “[A]t that time he was facing a primary . . . . [W]e can draw no other conclusion but that those 
initial statements that he made were to further his political ambition.” Excerpt Transcript Findings of 
Fact, supra note 4, at 17. For a discussion of the political context of Nifong’s public statements, see 
Mosteller, supra note 181, at 1354-57. 
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false fingernail found in a trash can of the bathroom where the rape alleg- 
edly occurred.236 He recounted that while he was not looking for this result 
because he did not anticipate it, he discovered in that examination of the 
data that foreign male DNA existed on the samples that was inconsistent 
with the DNA of each of the 46 Duke Lacrosse players and was therefore 
exculpatory.237 
Few defense attorneys, most of whom like Bannon have minimal sci- 
entific training, would have had the ability to do what he did even if they 
had the perseverance and could commit that amount of time to the task, 
which he believed was only gaining a better understanding of incriminating 
but ambiguous scientific results.238 Next, Bannon effectively assembled the 
full report based on DSI’s data on his own, and he presented those conclu- 
sions to experts to verify that he was accurately describing the conclusions 
to be drawn from that data.239 The product was included in a 17-page mo- 
tion to compel additional discovery regarding expert DNA analysis, which 
was filed on December 13, 2006, well after Nifong’s successful re- 
election.240 
The motion catalogued that: (1) on April 8-10, 2006, DSI conducted 
tests and concluded that multiple foreign (male) DNA sources that did not 
match Duke players were found on the rectal swabs and panties in the “rape 
kit” and that on April 10, Nifong met with Meehan at DSI;241 and (2) on 
April 18-19, 2006, DSI concluded that additional multiple foreign (male) 
DNA sources that did not match any Duke player was found on the pubic 
hair combings and that on April 20 or 21, Nifong again met with Meehan at 
 
236 Brad Bannon on Uncovering Unreported DNA Evidence (WRAL television broadcast June 14, 
2007) [hereinafter Bannon Unreported DNA Evidence], available at http://www.wral.com/news/local/ 
video/1500655/. 
237 
Id. 
238 Issues of ability and resources are both involved. When the case was dismissed and the players 
declared innocent, Reade Seligmann noted the importance of having the resources to contest the 
charges. See Duff Wilson & David Barstow, All Charges Dropped in Duke Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
2007, at A1 (“‘This entire experience has opened my eyes up to a tragic world of injustice I never knew 
existed . . . . If police officers and a district attorney can systematically railroad us with absolutely no 
evidence whatsoever, I can’t imagine what they'd do to people who do not have the resources to defend 
themselves.’”). Obviously, many criminal defendants do not have that luxury. Moreover, the ability to 
decipher the data usually requires specialized expertise. 
A point to take from the Duke Lacrosse case is that for indigent defendants, trial courts should 
freely grant requests for expert services to help the defense understand the significance of the evidence. 
Disclosure of data under Brady means little if it cannot be understood. Moreover, if as this case demon- 
strates, prosecutors may not flag the significance of the data, ready access to expertise is the only mean- 
ingful alternative. 
239 Bannon Unreported DNA Evidence, supra note 236. 
240 Motion to Compel Discovery: Expert D.N.A. Analysis, State v. Evans, Nos. 06 CRS 5581-83, 
4331-36 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2006), Exhibit 229, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Motion to Compel DNA Analysis]. 
241 Id. at 5-7. The motion lists results from five differently numbered items. Id. at 5-6. 
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DSI.242 The motion argued that the prosecution had failed to provide a re- 
port from the State’s expert as required by the discovery statute and poten- 
tially exculpatory evidence as required by the United States Constitution.243 
It asked the court to order, inter alia, the production of a report by DSI set- 
ting out the results of its analysis, the testimony of Meehan, and “[a]ny 
other Order this Court finds appropriate in the interest of justice.”244 
 
6. The Decisive December 15, 2006 Court Proceedings 
 
Early in the hearing on that motion conducted on December 15, 2006, 
Nifong made the somewhat cryptic statement that “[t]he first that I heard of 
this particular situation was when I was served with these reports—this 
motion on Wednesday of this week.”245 He then called Meehan of DSI to  
the stand and, without asking any questions on direct, tendered him to the 
defense for cross-examination.246 
Bannon examined Meehan first for an extended period. He ultimately 
asked Meehan whether “male DNA . . . found on multiple items from a rape 
kit [is] not probative evidence?”247 Meehan responded: 
 
No, that’s not a general rule, okay. This report was a specific report at the request and in dis- 
cussions with Mr. Nifong that we would report only specimens that matched evidence items. 
Only, we would only disclose or show on our report those reference specimens that matched 
evidence items. So that’s all that’s here.248 
 
Jim Cooney, lead counsel for Seligmann, then examined Meehan 
briefly. He first clarified Meehan’s description of some of the DNA profiles 
 
242  Id. at 8-9. 
243 Id. at 14-15. 
244 Id. at 15-16. 
245 Transcript of December 15, 2006 Hearing, supra note 182, at 14. In chambers before the hear- 
ing, Nifong again ambiguously stated: 
I just, in terms of the discovery issues, frankly, you know, I got the report [apparently refer- 
ring to the defense motion] and I was, like, whoa. So I immediately faxed a copy to Dr. 
Meehan and said, Read this and I’ll call you in the morning and get your opinion about this. 
And we discussed it and I said, This is a major issue for the defense. They’re entitled to hear 
about it and I think it needs to be addressed right away. And so that’s what we’re going to try 
to do, okay. 
Excerpt of Transcript of Proceeding in Chambers at 12, State v. Finnerty, Nos. 06 CRS 4331-36, 5582- 
83 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 2006), Exhibit 251, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). The 
Disciplinary Hearing Committee found that Nifong’s representations that he was unaware of the poten- 
tially exculpatory DNA results and their exclusion from DSI’s report were “intentional misrepresenta- 
tions and intentional false statements of material fact to the Court and to opposing counsel.” Amended 
Nifong Bar Order, supra note 3, ¶ 96. 
246 Transcript of December 15, 2006 Hearing, supra note 182, at 16-17. 
247 Id. at 59. 
248 Id. at 59-60. 
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as “weak,” but that even with regard to “weak profiles,” when a subject is 
excluded, the conclusion is with “a hundred percent scientific certainty” as 
applied to the conclusion that “none of the players match a profile.”249 
Cooney then returned to Bannon’s subject of the limited nature of the re- 
port, asking: 
 
Q. Did your report set forth the results of all of the tests and examinations that you conducted 
in this case? 
 
A. No. It was limited to only some results. 
 
Q. Okay. And that was an intentional limitation arrived at between you and representatives of 
the State of North Carolina not to report on the results of all examinations and tests that you 
did in his case? 
 
 
A. Yes.250 
 
At the close of Meehan’s testimony, the defense indicated it would 
“probably have additional motions,” but wanted an opportunity to review 
the transcript251 and evaluate options before it asked for further relief.252 As 
described in the next section, events moved with great speed after this hear- 
ing. Prompted by the North Carolina State Bar initiating disciplinary action, 
Nifong withdrew from the case less than a month later, which was before 
the next scheduled court hearing. 
 
 
249 Id. at 77-78. 
250 Id. at 85. See also Neff et al, supra note 182. Meehan softened his statements somewhat in his 
testimony before the Disciplinary Hearing Committee indicating that he anticipated a later more com- 
plete report and that the May 12, 2006 was prepared only as an interim report. See Meehan Testimony, 
supra note 182, at 66-69 (testifying that it was the only interim report he had ever been asked to pre- 
pare). However, after all testing was completed, Meehan called Nifong to inquire whether he wanted a 
final report but was told that he did not want one prepared. Id. at 97-98 (describing contact with Investi- 
gator Benjamin Himan in July 2006 after all the results were completed in which he asked if a final 
report was desired and Himan responding after consulting Nifong that he “would not need to issue a 
report”). The Committee’s Chairman was not impressed with the details of Meehan’s testimony, calling 
him at one point “Mr. Obfuscation” and describing him as an “‘erratic witness at best.’” Benjamin 
Niolet & Joseph Neff, Other Reputations Rose and Fell, Too, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 
19, 2007, http://www.newsobserver.com/news/crime_safety/duke_lacrosse/story/608853.html. But 
apparently because of Meehan’s testimony, it did not find that Nifong requested him to refrain from 
voluntarily giving relevant information to another party under Rule 3.4(f) of the Revised Rues of Profes- 
sional Conduct, Excerpt Transcript Findings of Fact, supra note 4, at 10, likely because of that change in 
testimony. 
251 Transcript of December 15, 2006 Hearing, supra note 182, at 93. 
252 Bannon Unreported DNA Evidence, supra note 236 (describing judgment to review other 
statements by Nifong before determining what, if any, allegations to make and remedies to seek based 
on his failure to provide exculpatory DNA evidence). 
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It was not until June 2007, after dismissal of charges and Nifong’s dis- 
barment, that attorneys for the three indicted players returned to the matters 
covered in the hearing. They filed a motion for criminal contempt with the 
trial judge,253 and the trial judge found probable cause focused on  the 
charge that Nifong willfully made false statements to the court on Septem- 
ber 22, 2006 in representing that all DNA evidence had been previously 
provided.254 In August 2007, Nifong was convicted of criminal contempt 
and sentenced to jail for a day.255 
 
C. Bar Proceedings Against Nifong and the End of Criminal Prosecution 
in the Duke Lacrosse Case 
 
After the defense motion was filed on December 13, 2006 and the 
revelations at the hearing two days later regarding undisclosed potentially 
exculpatory DNA evidence, events regarding the professional discipline of 
Michael Nifong unfolded rapidly. The criminal case was effectively taken 
from his hands because of a clear conflict of interest when the initial com- 
plaint by North Carolina was filed on December 28, 2006,256 and he was 
officially off the case as a result of his recusal approximately two weeks 
later.257 
On December 19, 2006, only four days after the hearing, the Bar sent a 
Letter of Notice to Nifong regarding failure to disclose the potentially ex- 
culpatory DNA evidence, instructions to Meehan to prepare a report that 
would not include such evidence, and previous false representations to the 
trial court that he did not know of such potentially exculpatory results.258 At 
 
253 Anne Blythe & Joseph Neff, Contempt Accusations Loom, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), 
June 23, 2007, at A20. 
254 Anne Blythe, Nifong Doesn’t Appear at Hearing, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 22, 
2007, at B1. 
255 On August 30, 2007 after a one day trial, Judge Osmond Smith found Nifong guilty of criminal 
contempt, concluding that, as to the statements made to the court on September 22, 2006 that he had 
supplied all DNA results, Nifong was aware that DNA results had not been provided and in so asserting 
that he “willfully and intentionally made false statements of material fact . . . .” Nifong Criminal Con- 
tempt Order, supra note 226, at 4. As punishment, the court sentenced Nifong to one day of imprison- 
ment. Id. at 6. 
256 Press Release, L. Thomas Lunsford II, Executive Dir. of the N.C. State Bar, State Bar Files 
Amended Complaint Against the Former Prosecutor in the Duke Lacrosse Case at 2 (Jan. 24, 2007) 
[hereinafter State Bar Files Amended Complaint], available at http://www.ncbar.com/Nifong_re- 
lease.pdf (noting that the original complaint was filed on December 28, 2006). 
257 See Attorney General’s Report, supra note 151, at 2 (indicating that Nifong formally requested 
that the Attorney General assume responsibility for the case on January 12, 2007 and that the Attorney 
General accepted it the next day). 
258 Letter of Notice from Katherine E. Jean, Counsel, N.C. State Bar, to Michael B. Nifong, Dur- 
ham County Dist. Attorney (Dec. 19, 2006), Exhibit 231, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). 
Nifong responded on December 28, 2006. First Nifong Response to Jean, supra note 7. The Bar sent 
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its quarterly meeting on January 18, 2007, the Bar’s Grievance Committee 
found probable cause to refer these additional charges to the Disciplinary 
Hearing Commission for trial.259 The State Bar’s Amended Complaint was 
filed on January 24, 2007.260 
However, these were not the charges that caused Nifong to ask the At- 
torney General to assume responsibility for the case and to recuse himself. 
Instead, those charges related to improper pretrial publicity,261 which were 
alleged to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the adjudi- 
cative proceeding and of heightening public condemnation of the accused in 
violation of Rules 3.6(a) and 3.8(f).262 The offensive statements were of 
three basic types. First, Nifong asserted confidence that a rape had oc- 
curred; second, he asserted that the Duke Lacrosse players had unified to 
withhold the truth; and third, he emphasized that the crime involved racist 
aspects.263 Nifong began making these statements on Monday, March 27, 
2006, the same day that he was briefed by the investigation officers on the 
facts of the case,264 and continued in a particularly intense barrage for the 
rest of that week.265 By his own admission, Nifong gave fifty to seventy 
interviews during that period,266 and he devoted more than forty hours to 
reporters.267 While the pace of comments decreased, they did not cease. The 
 
 
 
 
him a follow-up letter on January 5, 2007 asking for clarification on several points. Letter from Kathe- 
rine E. Jean, Counsel, N.C. State Bar, to Michael B. Nifong, Durham County Dist. Attorney (Jan. 5, 
2007), Exhibit 232, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). Nifong responded on January 16, 
2007. Letter from Michael B. Nifong, Durham County Dist. Attorney, to Katherine E. Jean, Counsel, 
N.C. State Bar (Jan. 16, 2007), Exhibit 234, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). 
259 State Bar Files Amended Complaint, supra note 256. 
260 Id. at 1. 
261 For a more complete examination of the basis for these charges, see Mosteller, supra note 181, 
at 1348-57. 
262 The Bar Complaint also alleged that some of these statements involved dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct. 
See Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 171, ¶ 291(a)-(b). This characterization of the state- 
ments was among the few that the Disciplinary Hearing Committee rejected. See Excerpt Transcript 
Findings of Fact, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
263 Mosteller, supra note 181, at 1350-52. 
264 Amended Nifong Bar Complaint, supra note 171, ¶¶ 9-10. 
265 See (second) Exhibit A, Chronological Stipulated Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 25-75, Exhibit 1, Nifong, 
No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author) (setting out nine statements made “on or before” March 27, 2006, 
ten statements made “on or before” March 28, 2006, four statements made “on or before” March 29, 
2006, twelve statements made “on or before” March 30, 2006, seven statements made “on or before” 
March 31, 2006, and two statements made “on or before” April 1, 2006). 
266 Joseph Neff, Nifong Conduct Rebuked Early, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 15, 
2007, at A1. 
267 John Stevenson, DA Halting Interviews Until Update; Nifong: No More Info on Alleged Rape 
for Now, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Apr. 4, 2006, at A1. 
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statements were made to both local and national media and included news- 
papers and other print media and television.268 
On August 21, 2006, the Bar sent a Letter of Notice to Nifong alleging 
these violations, which it supported by a long list of his statements to the 
press that began on March 27, 2006 and continued through the middle of 
June 2006,269 and as directed, Nifong responded promptly.270 On October  
19, 2006, a sixteen-member subcommittee of the Grievance Committee 
charged with initial consideration of the allegations against Nifong met to 
deliberate whether to recommend to the full Grievance Committee that a 
complaint should be filed based on improper pretrial publicity.271 The sub- 
committee’s vote was unanimous to recommend filing the complaint.272 It 
then considered whether to recommend waiting to file the ethics complaint 
until the criminal charges had been resolved against the three players, or to 
file it without delay.273 That was a more difficult issue for the group, and  
the vote resulted in a tie, with the committee chair, Jim Fox, then casting 
the decisive vote to proceed immediately.274 Later that same day, the full 
Grievance Committee, which consists of forty-two members, voted unani- 
mously to proceed without delay to file the grievance.275 That complaint, 
which relates to the improper pretrial publicity, was filed on December 28, 
2006 once the Bar Counsel had completed its formal preparation.276 
Disciplinary Hearing Committee Chairman F. Lane Williamson called 
this a “controversial decision.”277 He explained, “It was certainly unprece- 
dented that the State Bar would take disciplinary action against a prosecutor 
 
268 From March through April 2006, Nifong made statements to the following broadcast media: 
CBS, CNN, ESPN, MSNBC, WRAL News, MABC 11 TV News, and NBC 17 News. Amended Nifong 
Bar Complaint, supra note 219, ¶¶ 10-181. He also made statements to the following print media: Dur- 
ham Herald-Sun, News & Observer, Charlotte Observer, New York Times, USA Today, and Newsweek. 
Id. 
269 Letter of Notice from Katherine E. Jean, Acting Co-Counsel, N.C. State Bar , to Michael B. 
Nifong, Durham County Dist. Attorney at 1 & Exhibit A (Aug. 21, 2006), Exhibit 247, Nifong, No. 06 
DHC 35 (on file with author). 
270 Letter from Michael B. Nifong, Durham County Dist. Attorney, to Margaret Cloutier, Acting 
Co-Counsel, N.C. State Bar (Aug. 29, 2006), Exhibit 248, Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (on file with author). 
271 Letter from Wade Smith, Counsel for Collin Finnerty, to author (Nov 13, 2007) (on file with 
author) (describing the step-by-step decision process to file the initial grievance). 
272 
Id. 
273 
Id. 
274 Joseph Neff & Anne Blythe, Outcome Turned on Close Calls, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, 
N.C.), June 17, 2007, at A8. (describing the tie-breaking vote). 
275 Letter from Katherine E. Jean, Counsel, N.C. State Bar, to author at 2 (Sept. 13, 2007) (on file 
with author) (describing the general make-up and procedure of Grievance Committee and its subcom- 
mittees). 
276 Id. (noting preparation time for complaint after the full Grievance Committee finds probable 
cause and refers the case to the Disciplinary Hearing Commission for trial and describing general proce- 
dure of Grievance Committee). 
277 Excerpt Transcript Findings of Fact, supra note 4, at 21. 
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during the pendency of the case, when indeed the presiding judge had con- 
current and coextensive disciplinary jurisdiction.”278 He noted that this fil- 
ing led Nifong to recuse himself, and while he was not privy to the deci- 
sion, he was confident it “was a matter of serious debate as to whether to do 
that . . . because that [action] in itself took the justice system off track.”279 
Indeed, the flow of events was rapid after the complaint was filed on 
December 28, 2006.280 The next day, the North Carolina Conference of 
District Attorneys asked that Nifong step down.281 Nifong testified that he 
realized its filing meant that he had to recuse himself because he had a con- 
flict of interest, not being able to both defend himself and prosecute the 
case.282 Nifong met with Crystal Mangum on January 11, 2007283 and de- 
termined that she wanted to proceed with the prosecution.284 The next day, 
he asked the Attorney General to assume responsibility for the case,285 and 
on January 13, 2007, Attorney General Roy Cooper accepted the request.286 
Three months later, the Attorney General announced that as a result of 
the investigation of two special prosecutors from his office, Jim Coman and 
Mary Winstead, he was dismissing charges and had determined that Selig- 
mann, Finnerty, and Evans are innocent.287 In June, after a five-day hearing, 
the Disciplinary Hearing Committee found that Nifong had committed the 
vast bulk of the charged offenses, which were based on eleven different 
 
 
278 
Id. 
279 
Id. 
280 State Bar Files Amended Complaint, supra note 256. 
281 Eric Ferreri, Defense Claims Nifong’s Witness, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 30, 
2006, at B1; see also Lara Setrakian, DAs Call for Prosecutor in Duke Lacrosse Case to Step Down, 
ABC NEWS, Dec. 29, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/US/LegalCenter/story?id=2760232 (describing the 
North Carolina Conference of District Attorneys’ statement that “‘it is in the interest of justice and 
effective administration of justice that Mr. Nifong immediately withdraw and recuse himself from the 
prosecution’” as “yet another moral blow for Durham County”). 
During the Nifong disciplinary hearing, Thomas Anglim, an assistant district attorney from 
Washington, North Carolina testified that Nifong’s conduct had made jurors in his cases skeptical of the 
honesty of the State’s evidence. His testimony was offered to show the widespread disrespect Nifong’s 
conduct had brought to the administration of justice, which prosecutors felt acutely. I watched the live 
televised disciplinary hearing on June 15, 2007, and the statements about Mr. Anglim’s testimony are 
based on my personal recollections from that day. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Nifong’s dishonest conduct has affected jury’s perceptions of 
prosecutors across the country. See Benjamin Niolet, Lacrosse Case Leaving Mark in Courts, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 27, 2007, at B1 (recounting stories of the impact of the case in North 
Carolina and in other states). 
282 Nifong Testimony, supra note 184, at 174-75. 
283 March 20, 2006-January 14, 2007 Calendar of Michael B. Nifong, Exhibit 16, Nifong, No. 06 
DHC 35 (on file with author) (indicating a meeting with “Crystal” at 2:00 p.m. on January 11, 2007). 
284 Nifong Testimony, supra note 184, at 181. 
285 Id. at 180. 
286 Attorney General’s Report, supra note 151, at 2. 
287 Written Comments by Attorney Gen. Roy Cooper (Apr. 11, 2007) (on file with author). 
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provisions of the disciplinary rules.288 With regard to the DNA evidence, it 
found that Nifong violated applicable law, court rulings, and disciplinary 
rules related to his failure to provide discovery and disclosure of potentially 
exculpatory evidence as required by the Revised Rules of Professional 
Conduct.289 It also found that he made false statements of material fact to  
the trial court, opposing counsel, and the Grievance Committee regarding 
the potentially exculpatory evidence.290 
 
IV. LESSONS IN PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE FROM NORTH CAROLINA CASE 
STUDIES 
 
A. Full Open-File Discovery, Not Brady, Is the Workhorse and the Star 
 
The Gell, Hoffman, and Duke Lacrosse cases are examined here as 
disciplinary cases. As matters of constitutional law, the prosecutors’ con- 
duct implicates a body of law under the Due Process Clause that requires 
the prosecution to disclose evidence that is potentially helpful to the de- 
fense as to either guilt or punishment, which is frequently called the Brady 
doctrine.291 
These cases in fact involve different elements of that doctrine. Gell it- 
self covers two somewhat different types of violations. First, the statements 
of witnesses that the murder victim was alive at a time that proved Gell 
could not have committed the murder are evidence of innocence. As such, 
that evidence would fall directly under the Brady case.292 Another element 
 
288 In its oral finding, the panel found violations of Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), 3.4(d), 3.4(d)(3), 3.6(a), 
3.8(d), 3.8(f), 4.1, 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2006). 
Excerpt Transcript Findings of Fact, supra note 4, at 4-15. The initial written order omitted reference to 
Rule 3.4(c). Nifong Bar Order, supra note 3, Conclusions of Law ¶¶ (a)-(g). In response to an e-mail I 
wrote to the State Bar pointing out the discrepancy, the oversight was corrected and the order amended. 
Joseph Neff, Nifong Sends in His License, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 15, 2007, at A1. 
289 Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 3, Conclusions of Law ¶¶ (c)-(d); Excerpt Transcript 
Findings of Fact, supra note 4, at 6-10. 
Nifong had defended the charge in part on the grounds that he had not read the DSI report 
between May 12, 2006 when he received it and December 13, 2006 when he was served with the de- 
fense motion that stated the exculpatory foreign DNA results had not been disclosed. Nifong Testimony 
supra note 184, at 141-42, 246, 263, 269. The Disciplinary Hearing Committee rejected his claim, 
finding that he was aware that the written report did not reveal that information. Amended Nifong Bar 
Order, supra note 3, ¶ 71. 
290 Amended Nifong Bar Order, supra note 3, Conclusions of Law ¶¶ (d)-(h); Excerpt Transcript 
Findings of Fact supra note 4, at 10-14. 
291 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
292 The Brady case involved evidence that did not show innocence of the crime but went only to 
sentencing. Id. at 84. However, it tended to show that Brady’s co-defendant, not Brady, was the actual 
murderer and thus Brady was “innocent” of performing the act. Id. (focusing on the one withheld con- 
fession by the co-defendant Boblit in which he admitted the actual act of murder). 
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of the Gell case—the failure to disclose the impeaching statement of a 
prosecution witness regarding her need to “make up” a story—moves into 
another slightly different area of impeaching evidence that was recognized 
explicitly in Giglio v. United States293 as falling within the due process 
command.294 There is no need to clearly distinguish between evidence af- 
firmatively showing innocence and impeaching evidence, and the evidence 
in the Duke Lacrosse case of foreign male DNA on the accuser’s panties 
and other items from the “rape kit” can be seen as falling in either or both 
categories, although it is most clearly evidence that impeaches the story and 
the significance of the physical symptoms of the accuser. 
The evidence in the Hoffman case comes within the due process doc- 
trine and is similar to elements in the other cases in that it is impeaching, 
but it is also somewhat distinct. The evidence involves inducements given 
by a prosecutor or prosecutors to a “cooperating witness” to secure his tes- 
timony against the defendant. This evidence can be (merely) impeaching 
evidence if not disclosed and/or it can involve presentation of perjured tes- 
timony under an even older line of Supreme Court cases beginning with 
Napue v. Illinois.295 The distinction between those two types of violations  
is, in essence, the distinction between the Superior Court judge’s granting a 
new trial and the disciplinary complaint, which alleged intentional wrongful 
action and deceptive conduct by the prosecutors. Because of the termination 
of the disciplinary case on technical grounds, there is no resolution of the 
conflicting positions. 
Disclosure in these cases did not turn on the above-described distinc- 
tions in constitutional doctrine. Indeed, disclosure did not result from Brady 
at all. Instead, it was the consequence of discovery requirements, and the 
most important lesson that comes from these cases is the critical importance 
of full open-file discovery as an aid to justice. Once full disclosure was 
made in Gell and Hoffman, the convictions could not stand, and after full 
disclosure in the Duke Lacrosse case, District Attorney Nifong was, in short 
order, off the prosecution. The disciplinary proceedings were more compli- 
cated, but the success or failure of the disciplinary actions should not be the 
message. 
In Gell and Hoffman, correcting the criminal justice system mistakes 
occurred only after conviction during state “habeas” proceedings. This was 
because North Carolina had only adopted a broad discovery rule for death 
penalty cases when examined after conviction. In the Duke Lacrosse case, a 
similarly broad provision was applicable to trial proceedings. Although it 
took some substantial effort to secure the information, ultimately the broad 
 
 
293 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
294 Id. at 154-55 (referring to the importance of the witness’ credibility and the applicability of the 
due process doctrine to such evidence). 
295 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 
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command of the discovery statute meant that the critical data came into the 
defense’s possession earlier in the process—before trial. 
The largest and most important message of these cases is that full dis- 
closure solves, or at least helps solve, Brady issues. With regard to all these 
cases, there is no clear indication that any evidence was given to the de- 
fense because the prosecutor chose to provide exculpatory evidence or any 
court ordered the production of Brady evidence. As best I can determine, 
even in the Duke Lacrosse case, I can find no discretionary ruling that the 
trial court made in terms of discovery that was tilted in favor of the defense. 
Rather, the judges accepted the representations of the prosecutor and denied 
the innovative or unusual requests of the defense.296 The judges only  
granted what the discovery law required and did so in step by step fashion 
as the defense demonstrated the existence of the evidence and the law’s 
application to it. 
What we collectively call the Brady doctrine was the legal basis for re- 
lief in Gell and Hoffman. However, the Due Process Clause had no direct 
role in producing the evidence. The workhorse and the star were the mun- 
dane discovery laws. 
In its alternative form of an intentional presentation of false evidence 
regarding the inducements given to the witness, the Hoffman case is some- 
what different. There, what discovery reveals will often be less decisive. 
This is because the evidence of violation is not separate from the prosecu- 
tors. The critical evidence is not, as in the Gell case, the statement of other 
witnesses given to SBI agents or tape recorded, nor is it the conclusions and 
data of scientific experts, as in the Duke Lacrosse case. Rather, it is the 
work of prosecutors in their own conversations with the witness, which 
itself can be straightforward in significance when promises are clear or can 
be the subject of interpretation and dispute when the inducements, if they 
exist, are ambiguous or vague. Evidence of wrongdoing in which the prose- 
cutor is directly involved will rarely be recorded in easily discoverable 
documents. As in Hoffman, full discovery will help, but often much addi- 
tional investigation by the defense will be required. 
Brady and related doctrines are important but did not unearth the evi- 
dence in the three cases described. Moreover, although they have some 
effect on prosecutorial conduct, their purpose is not to provide “a code of 
ethics for prosecutors,” but rather the Due Process Clause is concerned 
“with the manner in which persons are deprived of their liberty.”297 Thus, a 
prosecutor’s decision not to disclose arguably exculpatory evidence under 
Brady is not judged directly as to the correctness of the determination that 
 
296 Part of the reason for such judicial action is that the trial court typically must expect the lawyers 
to “act in good faith,” as Judge Helms stated in refusing a defense request for more extensive examina- 
tion of the files. Trial Transcript of October 30, 1996 at 1589, Exhibits to Third Amended Hoffman 
MAR, supra note 8, Exhibit 4.10(c). 
297 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511 (1984). 
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the evidence is exculpatory. Rather, that decision is reviewed only after it is 
“filtered through” the trial of the case under the doctrine’s materiality re- 
quirement, and the decision is frequently affected by the strength of the 
other evidence in the case. Moreover, the question is typically examined 
only after a jury has convicted the defendant, with the understandable im- 
pact that that result has on courts to affirm in the interest of finality.298 
 
B. The Difficult Issues of Prosecutor’s Intent and Knowledge as to Disci- 
plinary Action for Failure to Provide Potentially Exculpatory Evi- 
dence 
 
Ethical principles, Brady, and our adversary system require a prosecu- 
tor to operate with a type of split personality. An important aspirational 
principle of the American public prosecutor is that he or she should first 
seek justice rather than being motivated simply to win the case. A subpart 
of that command is that the prosecutor should not charge or convict an in- 
nocent person. Often this command is stated in terms of the importance of 
the prosecutor reaching his or her own conclusion about the guilt of the 
defendant. Unless convinced that the defendant is guilty to some level of 
subjective certainty (probable cause, beyond a reasonable doubt, moral cer- 
tainty), the prosecutor should not proceed. In a moment I will suggest the 
weakness of that command, but here I want to affirm that, as someone who 
worked for seven years as a public defender, I strongly believe that princi- 
ple is of fundamental importance to the criminal justice system. 
However, for a prosecutor who has reached the conclusion that the ac- 
cused is guilty, which obviously should be updated as new evidence is re- 
ceived, there can be no true exculpatory evidence. If it is truly exculpatory, 
the case should be dismissed, or that thought should be seriously enter- 
tained. Otherwise, the evidence must be not really exculpatory, and there- 
fore, is simply useful ammunition for the defense in the adversary battle of 
the criminal trial.299 Once the sweep of evidence has been examined and the 
prosecutor is committed to the rightness of the prosecution, Brady is not felt 
as a moral command, unless something stunning is observed. It is rather 
part of the requirements of the job, and making close calls in favor of con- 
 
298 See Rosen supra note 139, at 707-08 (arguing that the doctrine makes sense as a matter fairness 
to the individual but that it is accordingly a poor vehicle for deterring prosecutors from suppressing 
evidence). 
299 This observation about the almost inherent “schizophrenia” of Brady is frequently noted. See, 
e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 
33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 653-54 (2002) (describing the mental process of a prosecutor who includes 
the materiality requirement of Brady as “a Zen-like state of harmonizing objective and subjective be- 
liefs, simultaneously recognizing that the evidence creates a reasonable probability that a reasonable 
jury will entertain a reasonable doubt while still subjectively believing that continued prosecution is 
warranted”). 
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victing the guilty. This perspective, which produced the wrong calls, is 
more understandable, if still unacceptable under the rules of professional 
responsibility and the commands of due process. Add in the adversarial 
nature of our criminal trial system, and one should anticipate that mistakes 
will be made. With this mindset, one can imagine in particular how not 
revealing all the details of a negotiation with a recalcitrant witness, who is 
offered the opportunity to have her criminal responsibility reduced in order 
to motivate the witness to testify against a guilty murderer, might be tempt- 
ing if some of the inducements were vague or contingent. 
The beauty of full open-file discovery is obvious as a remedy for the 
difficulty of subjective choice in a competitive adversarial environment. It 
does not require a prosecutor to make difficult discretionary decisions. The 
prosecutors in Gell and Hoffman asserted they made no choice at all be- 
cause they did not know of the exculpatory evidence, and even Nifong 
claimed that he did not know the foreign DNA evidence had not been dis- 
closed. The circumstantial evidence from these cases suggests, however, 
that in at least one case, and perhaps more, a choice was made and it was 
incorrect. Disclosing all evidence, or realistically moving strongly in that 
direction, means that most Brady evidence will be disclosed as part of the 
routine. 
In Gell, the prosecutors asserted that they did not know about the evi- 
dence in their files that was potentially helpful to the defense, and in Hoff- 
man, the prosecutors claimed that they did not know what inducements 
others had given, effectively what was in another government officer’s 
files. Nifong somewhat grudgingly acknowledged that he knew of the po- 
tentially exculpatory evidence,300 but then made the more limited and less 
credible claim that he did not know that Meehan’s report had omitted it.301 
 
300 See Nifong Testimony supra note 184, at 283-84 (“There’s no question it’s potentially exculpa- 
tory.”); id. at 289 (stating that he thought he had agreed that the foreign male DNA was “potentially 
exculpatory”). In his initial response to the Bar, Nifong characterized the foreign male DNA as “non- 
inculpatory” rather than “specifically exculpatory.” Exhibit 233, supra note 7, at 3. Nifong used some of 
the same qualifying language regarding the exculpatory nature of the DNA evidence in his testimony 
and only grudgingly accepted that it was potentially exculpatory character, but recognized his responsi- 
bility for disclosure under the discovery statute. See Nifong Testimony supra note 184, at 289-90. He 
contended that when he heard of the evidence from Dr. Meehan, he did not appreciate that it had any 
significance as exculpatory evidence. See id. (answering that when he met with Meehan he did not 
recognize it as “specifically exculpatory” and indeed “didn’t think it proved anything at all in this case, 
in light of the profession of the victim and also in light of the fact that no determination, no conclusion 
could be drawn about where the evidence came from, how long it had been there or anything like that”); 
id. at 291 (“I didn’t think it proved anything at all about the facts and circumstance of what occurred on 
March 13th and 14th, that evening.”); id. at 298 (“[I]t did not occur to me that that DNA belonged to the 
perpetrators.”). 
301 See Nifong Testimony supra note 184, at 141-42, 246, 263, 269 (claiming he had not read the 
DSI report between May 12, 2006 and December 13, 2006 when he received the defense motion setting 
out that the foreign male DNA had not been disclosed or had not read it with any appreciation of that 
issue). 
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The disciplinary rule requires proof of the content of the mind of an- 
other, and proof of knowledge is generally difficult. Given the assumption 
that prosecutors have already morally decided that the defendant is guilty, 
the claim that they did not see and recognize the exculpatory evidence is 
somewhat more plausible. Also, the chance of perceiving their exculpatory 
quality is diminished because documents that appear unhelpful to the prose- 
cution are generally likely to receive far less attention than those that are 
recognized as incriminating the defendant. 
In all three cases, defense attorneys, through inquiries and demands, 
brought attention to the specific type of information that was ultimately 
found. Calling attention to the issue did not produce results, however. No 
decision of a trial court turned on the specific request. Instead, it was the 
discovery mandate, made effective by repeated specific requests, that 
opened the door to disclosure. 
 
C. Proof of Knowledge of Potentially Exculpatory Evidence for Discipli- 
nary Action 
 
The Gell case taught the difficulty of proving that the prosecutors in 
charge of his prosecution knew the contents of the investigative files. The 
quantity of material overlooked, and some of the evidence that other, albeit 
self-interested, witnesses would have offered if asked, strains the credulity 
of the claim of lack of knowledge and intent.302 However, counsel for the 
State Bar may well have acted with appropriate restraint as prosecutors 
charged themselves with “doing justice” and refrained from pursuing a 
claim of intentional wrongdoing lest they pursue a potentially unsupported 
charge.303 In any case, the Bar’s decision not to litigate the claim more ag- 
gressively doomed any effort to establish more serious violations. 
 
302 See supra note 56 (discussing evidence potentially in conflict with the claims of lack of knowl- 
edge and intent). 
303 A recent filing in the Gell’s pending civil case against some of those involved in the investiga- 
tion contends that intentional withholding of exculpatory evidence was done by SBI agent Dwight 
Ransome, rather than by Hoke and Graves. See Joseph Neff, Gell’s Suit Gets a Boost: Ex-DA: Evidence 
Was Hidden, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 3, 2007, at A1 (describing allegations derived 
from a deposition of the original prosecutor, David Beard, that the key government witnesses were 
dissuaded from their inclination change their story in a meeting with him and SBI agent Dwight Ran- 
some, which was not disclosed either the Hoke and Graves or to Gell’s defense attorneys); Memoran- 
dum in Support of Motion to Reopen Deposition of Defendant Dwight Ransome, Gell v. Ransome, No. 
2:05-CV-21-FL, (E.D.N.C. July 24, 2007) (on file with author). The allegations in this pleading argue 
that the focus of intentional wrongdoing, which the large body of undisclosed exculpatory evidence 
suggests, would appropriately have been directed at an investigator, Ransome, rather than at the special 
prosecutors, Hoke and Graves. Id. at 1-4. 
The uncertainty regarding knowledge and responsibility of the various actors involved in this 
investigation and prosecution illustrates one of the difficulties of establishing knowledge of wrongdoing 
by a particular prosecutor, which is generally required for disciplinary action and particularly for impo- 
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From the perspective of professional discipline, the decision of the 
Disciplinary Hearing Committee in Gell increased the likelihood of proof of 
a violation in concluding that ignorance of the contents of the file was not a 
complete defense and that prosecutors have “a duty under the Rules of Pro- 
fessional Conduct and existing case law to know the contents of the investi- 
gation files in the possession of the State and its agents.”304 The results of 
the Disciplinary Review Committee appointed in the wake of the Gell case, 
which produced the modification of Rule 3.8(d) to require disclosure of 
potentially exculpatory evidence “after reasonably diligent inquiry”305 so- 
lidified that result. 
One substantial question is what these changes do, not to professional 
discipline per se, which is not generally considered an end in itself, but far 
more critical to the disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence. Profes- 
sor Fred Zacharias, who writes frequently about professional discipline and 
the discipline of prosecutors, has suggested a number of reasons why disci- 
pline is infrequent.306 One of those is the availability of alternative judicial 
remedies for some violations.307 He sees a potential inverse relationship 
between disciplinary action and legal relief for the defendant. He assumes 
that disciplinary agencies may be deterred from action because they fear 
that courts may be less willing to provide judicial relief if such relief almost 
automatically results in disciplinary action against prosecutors (or defense 
attorneys for ineffective assistance).308 
From a policy objective, one should worry about a change in discipli- 
nary rules that could have a negative effect on the willingness of courts to 
reverse convictions based on a Brady violation even though the change 
makes professional discipline of prosecutors for such violations more 
likely. Fortunately, I believe that at least in the form and in the context that 
these changes have occurred in North Carolina, they are likely to be benefi- 
cial rather than deleterious to effective production of exculpatory informa- 
 
sition of serious sanctions. Even more powerfully, the uncertainty underlines the importance of full 
open-file discovery rather that simply access to the trial prosecutor’s files so that the defense is assured 
access to, not only the immediate prosecutor’s files, but also to those of other investigative and prosecu- 
torial agents who have been involved in the case. 
304 Hoke & Graves Disciplinary Order, supra note 1, Conclusion of Law ¶ 2(a). 
305 Whether this apparently admirable change in Rule 3.8(d) will make it less likely that courts will 
reverse convictions on the basis of Brady violations because finding such a violation will now be more 
likely to result in professional discipline of the prosecutor in charge is yet to be seen. Fortunately, the 
change in the ethics rule occurred in an environment of broad discovery, which should limit the number 
of cases where discovery of exculpatory information occurs after conviction and effectively reduce the 
opportunity for prosecutorial misconduct. 
306 Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001). 
307 Id. at 758 (arguing that as long as alternative remedies such as exclusion of evidence and appel- 
late reversal are sufficient to signal that the conduct is wrong and to discourage future violations, disci- 
plinary agencies may perceive little marginal benefit taking disciplinary action). 
308 Id. at 754. Zacharias assumes the same would apply to findings of ineffective assistance of 
counsel against defense attorneys. Id. 
 2008] THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF FULL OPEN-FILE DISCOVERY 313 
 
tion and accurate judicial rulings when the constitutional command is not 
followed. First, in the absence of intent, the sanction will be the limited one 
of at most a reprimand. Second, the judicial ruling that the evidence is not 
material does not eliminate the ethical violation, and a trial court’s state- 
ment that evidence has no exculpatory potential is both unlikely and should 
carry little weight if the undisclosed evidence is like that impeaching the 
star witnesses in Gell, the inducements given to the “cooperating witness” 
in Hoffman, or the foreign DNA in the Duke Lacrosse case. Also, the full 
open-file discovery rule provides the default position, which is that all evi- 
dence is disclosed, that vastly reduces the incentive for non-disclosure and 
the potential efficacy of any effort to withhold. 
 
D. General Factors Affecting Discipline of Prosecutors 
 
Obviously, before the bar can institute action, it must learn of the mis- 
conduct, which usually depends upon the complaint of a third party, and 
because prosecutors lack dissatisfied clients to make such complaints, many 
violations will go unnoticed.309 Criminal defendants have large incentives to 
complain about the person who heads their prosecution, and their claims 
should be discounted by the bar as a result.310 Defense counsel in criminal 
cases are pushed in several directions. In many situations, defense attorneys 
will be deterred from filing or notifying the bar of a prosecutor’s ethical 
misconduct because, as in the Hoffman case,311 taking such action may be 
viewed as more likely to hurt the defendants’ interests than aid them.312 
Also, counsel may feel the negative impact personally in that instituting 
disciplinary proceedings may antagonize a frequent opponent, without 
much chance of success based on the understood history of infrequent or 
tepid discipline of prosecutors.313 On the other hand, if notifying the bar of a 
violation would produce a public bar proceeding, defense counsel has a 
strong incentive to file the complaint and thereby gain an adversarial advan- 
tage by affecting public opinion in the fairness of the proceedings and by 
potentially disqualifying the prosecutor. 
Given this latter strategic defense incentive, the bar must have some 
concern with its timing in filing of complaints. Zacharias believes the result 
 
309 Id. at 749. 
310 Id. at 749 n.100, 758-59 & n.131. 
311 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
312 See Zacharias, supra note 306, at 749-50 & n.101 (noting that while defense counsel frequently 
file pleadings alleging prosecutorial misconduct, taking action that results in disciplinary proceedings is 
far more unusual because of not only its potential to harm the client but also to antagonize what is likely 
a frequent opponent); see also Rosen, supra note 139, at 735 (noting the disincentives of sensible de- 
fense counsel given the small chance of success in securing professional discipline and the negative 
potential impact of filing a charge on client’s interest and the lawyer’s continued criminal law practice). 
313 Zacharias, supra note 306, at 749. 
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is that many times disciplinary agencies do not entertain the complaint until 
the criminal case has been completed. If the disciplinary committees do in 
fact take such a position, defense counsel will, in turn, lose much of their 
interest in filing complaints and suffering the potential consequences with- 
out case-related benefits.314 
In the Duke Lacrosse case, the North Carolina State Bar publicly initi- 
ated proceedings against Nifong in December 2006 and precipitated Ni- 
fong’s withdrawal from the case. That cannot be expected to be a frequent 
result, although in the Duke Lacrosse case, it was clearly the right decision. 
One assumes, whether or not formal rules dictate caution, prudential con- 
cerns will. 
Nifong’s discipline notwithstanding, withholding potentially exculpa- 
tory information typically comes to the attention of disciplinary authorities 
only after trial and after the publication of an opinion reversing a conviction 
for a constitutional violation of Brady.315 Post-conviction disclosure of the 
violation means that a disciplinary agency typically is not faced with an 
issue of whether instituting disciplinary action against the prosecutor will 
interfere with the initial trial. However, it can affect a retrial. The impact, 
other than by way of publicity that may affect juror perception,316 is likely 
less substantial because of another factor that Zacharias believes generally 
moderates the rigor of discipline against prosecutors. Career prosecutors are 
in the minority so that a prosecutor who committed an ethical violation is 
often no longer serving as a prosecutor,317 particularly if a number of years 
have passed, as is typically the case, when the violation is discovered dur- 
ing post-conviction proceedings. 
 
314 Id. at 749-50 n.100, 758-59; see also id. at 762 (noting that this concern can even encourage  
delay in disciplinary action until after the completion of appellate review). 
315 Id. at 759, 669-70. 
316 Because charges against Hoffman were dismissed because the prosecutor concluded he had 
insufficient evidence to conduct the retrial, see Emily C. Achenbaum, A Murder Case Dissolves, NEWS 
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 12, 2007, at A1, the publicity surrounding the filing and dismissal of 
disciplinary proceedings against the prosecutors could not have affected the jury, although it likely 
helped produce media interest that led to the key witness’ statement to a newspaper reporter that he had 
made up his story against Hoffman. See id. The larger impact, not only on publicity, but on creation of 
evidence should likely be with the disciplinary hearing itself, and no evidentiary hearing was ever con- 
ducted for the prosecutors in the Hoffman case. The disciplinary hearing for the prosecutors in Gell did 
not take place until after the retrial had been completed, and the State Bar called no witnesses. 
317 Zacharias, supra note 306, at 762. When the disciplinary proceeding was conducted for the 
prosecutors in the Hoffman case years after the failure to provide exculpatory information occurred,  
they were no longer serving in that capacity. See Neff, supra note 96, at A1. 
One of the reasons Zacharias believes disciplinary agencies are less inclined to impose disci- 
pline is that the prosecutor who committed the offense is no longer in a position of public responsibility 
as a prosecutor. Id. That rationale would be only partly applicable in part in Gell and Hoffman in that all 
the attorneys were no longer prosecutors, but Hoke and Brewer had assumed other important positions 
in the criminal justice system. Nifong, by contrast, was still in office as District Attorney with no indica- 
tions of intending to depart voluntarily when he was disciplined. 
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Zacharias also notes that disciplinary agencies are more hesitant to act 
against prosecutors as the result of the general recognition that the electoral 
process provides an alternative check on misconduct and specific concern 
about disciplinary action affecting political campaigns.318 Moreover, they 
understand that some violations, such as pretrial publicity, are frequently 
driven by excessive zeal in the pursuit of the public good that makes the 
violation somewhat less blameworthy.319 By contrast, if the conduct is mo- 
tivated by venal incentives, disciplinary action is more likely.320 Under 
Zacharias’ general analysis, the circumstances surrounding the pretrial pub- 
licity in the Duke Lacrosse case were tailored to induce action by the Bar. 
Although not directly securing a financial benefit, as is the most frequent 
venal incentive, Nifong was apparently acting, not out of an excess of zeal, 
but in his personal interest, and he did so in a way that made the electoral 
check on misconduct less likely to be effective.321 
 
E. Inadequacy of Professional Discipline to Rectify Inadequacies of 
Brady 
 
At the beginning of this Part, I developed the evidence from Gell and 
Hoffman that the Brady responsibility on prosecutors and/or Brady de- 
mands are inadequate to produce disclosure of exculpatory information. 
The succeeding sections demonstrate why, even if Brady violations are 
unearthed, professional discipline is unlikely, and if forthcoming, is likely 
to result in only modest sanctions because of the difficulty of proof of the 
intent of the prosecutor. While the theoretical reach of professional disci- 
plinary rules is broader than the Brady doctrine, the practicalities of profes- 
sional discipline renders them generally narrower in actual application. 
 
 
318    Id. at 761. 
319    Id. at 757. 
320 See id. at 745-46, 757 (giving the examples of actions such as bribery and embezzlement that 
are taken for financial gain). 
321 In his statement explaining the result, Disciplinary Hearing Committee Chairman F. Lane 
Williamson stated that “we can draw no other conclusion but that those initial statements were to further 
his political ambition.” Excerpt Transcript Findings of Fact, supra note 4, at 17. For a discussion of the 
political context of Nifong’s public statements, see Mosteller, supra note 181, at 1354-57. 
Zacharias argues that, because it is readily observable, improper pretrial publicity is not con- 
strained by the difficulty of the bar learning of the violation and thus the minimal discipline that disci- 
plinary authorities have imposed on such conduct is inexplicable and unjustified, particularly because no 
other agency—not internal discipline by the prosecutor’s office or effective judicial action—is likely to 
impose discipline. Zacharias, supra note 306, at 769 & nn.167-68 (assuming that office policy likely 
supported the publicity for the benefits in the litigation or in office image, and as to judicial action, 
noting that while contempt is a possible remedy, more likely it is a less directly effective remedy such as 
change of venue). For Zacharias, the discipline imposed on Nifong based on improper pretrial publicity 
should be the case that proves the rule. 
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As a result, I contend we cannot theoretically depend upon the broader 
scope of professional disciplinary rules and/or the threat of bar sanctions 
directly upon the prosecutor to enhance the effectiveness of Brady’s legal 
requirements. Although the legal and ethical rules regarding exculpatory 
information, both separately and operating together, are extraordinarily 
helpful, they are far from fully effective in producing such information to 
the defendant. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Nifong’s misconduct may be unique in its breadth and clarity. How- 
ever, he is far from unique among prosecutors in failing to disclose not only 
arguably exculpatory information, but exculpatory evidence that is material 
to guilt under Brady and therefore requires reversal and the granting of a 
new trial. 
In this article, I examined two other cases that resulted in reversals of 
first degree murder convictions that produced death sentences and profes- 
sional disciplinary actions—the Gell case that spawned the Hoke and 
Graves disciplinary action and the Hoffman prosecution that produced the 
truncated disciplinary proceeding against Honeycutt and Brewer. Both in- 
volved Brady violations in death penalty cases. In ten cases since 1998, 
including Gell and Hoffman, defendants who had been sent to death row 
had their cases reversed and new trials granted because of violations of the 
obligation under Brady to produce exculpatory evidence.322 
It is hard to imagine that any prosecutor would work to convict and 
sentence to death a defendant whom the prosecutor believed to be innocent. 
Undoubtedly, in each of these death penalty cases, the prosecutors believed 
their public duty was to convict a real murderer, who was a grave threat to 
society.323 They either did not see the exculpatory evidence, they did not 
recognize its exculpatory value, or they believed the evidence was not ma- 
terial under Brady. 
Many examples could be given of a prosecutor who apparently had 
such a perspective, but among the North Carolina cases noted in this article, 
one of the clearest comes from McDowell v. Dixon.324 In that case, the 
Fourth Circuit ordered a new trial for McDowell, a black defendant, be- 
cause the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence that an eyewitness initially 
322 See supra note 11; see also Neff & Weigl, supra note 11 (listing five additional reversals on 
Brady grounds from 1998 to 2003). 
323 Professor Richard Moran indicates that his study of 124 exonerations of death row inmates  
from 1973 to 2007 showed that 80 resulted from intentional actions, not good faith mistakes, and that 
some resulted from criminal justice officials acting with what they considered good intentions to ensure 
the conviction of a person they thought was guilty. Richard Moran, Op-Ed., The Presence of Malice, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at A17. 
324 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1988). 
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told law enforcement authorities that the perpetrator was white.325 The 
prosecutor testified that he had read the files containing the variant racial 
description but did not disclose that description because he did not consider 
the various descriptions exculpatory.326 That is an extraordinary judgment. 
Since we must assume that the prosecutors were personally convinced 
of the guilt of each of these defendants, obviously to them the undisclosed 
evidence was not truly exculpatory for that would have meant that their 
judgment on guilt was wrong. In this context, if they recognized the excul- 
patory potential at all, they may have been playing the adversarial game to 
win. Wanting to win a conviction of a ruthless murderer is hardly a fault.327 
For whatever reason, these prosecutors (or the investigators supporting 
them) failed a critical test. The number of failures in such serious cases 
suggests that perhaps the law and ethical provisions require too much of 
mortals in the fierce battle of high stakes criminal litigation. 
In Nifong’s case, the North Carolina State Bar “stepped to the plate,” 
and its disciplinary process soundly responded by judging and punishing his 
misconduct in failing to disclose exculpatory DNA evidence. Perhaps the 
severity of the sanction will send a strong message to other prosecutors and 
deter any thought of less than full disclosure of potentially helpful evidence 
and information for the defense in the future. 
However, in his letter to the Bar responding to its initial notice regard- 
ing his failure to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence, Nifong re- 
counted that among prosecutorial circles the “word on the street” was that 
the Bar was looking to impose harsh punishment on a prosecutor to make 
up for recent failures in the Gell and Hoffman cases.328 He thus indicated 
that he was aware from conversations in prosecutorial circles that the Bar 
was likely looking for an opportunity to impose firm discipline. Yet, his 
letter demonstrates that even awareness of this pointed message did not stop 
his misconduct. 
325    Id. at 949-50. 
326 Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 25-26, McDowell, 858 F.2d 945 (No. 87-4006) (on file with 
author) (citing the hearing transcript for the prosecutor’s assessment that he saw nothing exculpatory in 
the files); State v. McDowell, Nos. 1979 CRS15665-66, slip op. at 23 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1984) 
(on file with author) (stating that the prosecutor “did not consider the various descriptions contained in 
police reports to be exculpatory to the defendant”). On appeal, the State argued that initial description of 
the assailant as white was not material because the badly injured victim was “semi-conscious” at the 
time she gave it. McDowell, 858 F.2d at 950. 
327 This perceived phenomenon has been described somewhat differently by other authors. See, 
e.g., Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475 
(2006); Kevin A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal 
Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006); Randall Grometstein, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Noble-Cause 
Corruption, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 2 (2007). 
328 See First Nifong Response to Jean, supra note 7 (stating that “[f]or some time now, the ‘word 
on the street’ in prosecutorial circles has been that the North Carolina State Bar, stung by the criticism 
resulting from past decisions involving former prosecutors with names like Hoke and Graves and 
Brewer and Honeycutt, is looking for a prosecutor of which to make an example”). 
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The disbarment of Nifong will likely help. The sanction imposed sends 
a strong message, and surely it will encourage future disclosures of poten- 
tially exculpatory evidence. However, the message to be taken from North 
Carolina’s experience, including both its failures and triumphs in prosecuto- 
rial discipline, is that broad disclosure laws make the real difference. The 
ethics process helped produce important reforms, but in the end, the disci- 
plinary process was the beneficiary of the information flow the discovery 
laws initiated. I do not ignore the costs of full open-file discovery, but the 
benefits to the innocent are very real. Clearly, the path to the successful 
discipline of Nifong followed the road opened by the broad statutory dis- 
covery mandates, first in death sentence cases during post-conviction pro- 
ceedings and then in all felony cases at trial. 
